South Carolina Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 2

1963

The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law
Ernest L. Folk III
University of South Carolina School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Folk, Ernest L. III (1963) "The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law," South Carolina Law
Review: Vol. 15 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Folk: The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law

THE MODEL ACT AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA
CORPORATION LAW*
ERNEST L. FOLK, III**

I. INTRODUCTION
The South Carolina Business Corporaton Act of 1962 was
unanimously passed by the General Assembly and a few days
later was signed into law by the Governor on March 30, 1962.
This new statute represents a completely new look in corporation law for South Carolina. The prior law was no more
than a collection of ad hoc provisions, enacted by the General
Assembly as the need arose from time to time over a period
of 150 years, and given the semblance of a corporate law
only by their arrangement in the usual corporate law sequence. As a consequence, the prior law suffered from a
remarkable combination of gaps, ambiguities, uncertainties,
redundancies, and archaic restrictions with little or no bearing on contemporary problems.
Like virtually all recent corporate law revisions, the South
Carolina law is largely patterned after the Model Business
Corporation Act developed by the Committee on Corporation
Law of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association.1 The new South Carolina law, however, contains some distinctive and noteworthy
variations from the Model Act, although most of these are by
way of adding provisions not found in the Model Act. The
new statute, as a whole and in its details, recognizes what
seemed to the South Carolina revisers to be the true function of the Model Act: that is, to serve, not as a uniform law
*This article is a somewhat modified version of an article originally
written at the invitation of The Business Lawyer, the journal of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association. It first appeared in the January 1963 issue (18 Bus. LAW.
351), and is reprinted, with some additional material chiefly of local interest, with the generous permission of The Business Lawyer and of its
Editor, Ray Garrett, Jr., Esquire, of the Illinois Bar, whose cooperation
and assistance are gratefully acknowledged.
**Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. For the sake of brevity, sections of the South Carolina Business
Corporation Act of 1962 are cited simply as, e.g., "S. C. §6.21." (Occasional
citations to the prior South Carolina law are to the Code of Laws, e.g.,
"S. C. CODE §12-311.") The American Bar Association Model Business
Corporation Act is cited as, e.g., IMoDEL AcT §31"; the text in the annotated version is taken as definitive.
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to be adopted in identical or near identical form in all jurisdictions, but rather as a framework for a streamlined corporation law, sufficiently flexible to accommodate widely differing state policies toward corporate enterprise without at
the same time sacrificing some measure of corporate law
similarity.
This article, then, undertakes to examine a selected group
of significant and distinctive provisions of the new South
Carolina statute against the background of the old law and
the Model Act. It does not attempt to deal with every feature, or to justify each point at which the balance was struck
between the competing interests involved in any corporation
statute. Although the article is primarily expository, it does
compare many of the South Carolina provisions with Model
Act sections where there is contrast, and indicates some considerations prompting the choice of provisions not paralleled
in the Model Act. It is also worth noting that most of these
non-Model Act provisions have counterparts in other states,
including some of those jurisdictions which have recently
carried through the most searching analysis and study prior
to enacting their new statutes. Indeed, the South Carolina
law is, in large measure, a product of the knowledge and
experience accumulating in successive state corporation law
revisions. To ignore these developments and to adopt verbatim or nearly verbatim any one statute would be deliberately to isolate a corporate law revision from much of the best
thinking in this field.
II.

CORPORATE LAW REVISION IN A SMALL STATE:
THE SOUTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE

A.

The Revision Process:From Inception to Enactment.

Before examining specific provisions of the South Carolina
statute, it is helpful to retrace the steps leading from the determination to revise the corporation law to its final enactment, and to note some of the problems and decisions confronting the revisors. This is especially useful because the
South Carolina experience is undoubtedly typical of many
states confronted with the need to revise their corporate
laws. Thus, unlike the comprehensive research and drafting
techniques used in the New York corporate law revision,
South Carolina had neither the resources nor the need for

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/2

2

1963]

THEFolk:
MODEL
ACT Act
AND
S C. Carolina
CORP. Corporation
LAW
277
The Model
andTHE
the South
Law

such an undertaking, nor did it face baffling and complex
problems confronting New York or any other large commercial state with many pronounced and divergent interests.
Like many states only recently emerging from a rural to an
industrial economy, South Carolina did not have a heavy
burden of prior decisions to contend with. Apart from the
old corporation statute and some special constitutional problems, it had a relatively clean slate on which to write. All
of these factors shaped, in some measure, one final result.
The new South Carolina corporate statute had its inception in 1960 when the General Assembly created a joint committee, consisting of members of both houses together with
appointees of the Governor and the Secretary of State ex
officio, to consider revising both the Securities and the Corporation Law.2 The first objective was achieved when the
1961 General Assembly enacted the Uniform Securities Law.
In this field uniformity with Federal and other state laws
was recognized as the overriding consideration in order to
facilitate multi-state offerings of securities.
The preparation of a new corporate statute was approached from a different angle. One of the first decisions was also
one of the most natural ones: the recognition that no existing corporation law could be adopted without modification.
For example, although the Delaware law affords incomparable opportunities to corporate enterprise as well as an unusual degree of certainty because of the many Delaware decisions construing the law, the committee rejected a proposal,
at an early point, to copy the Delaware Act. Apart from the
fact that the Delaware law is not perfect-indeed, many
Delaware corporate law decisions result from ambiguities or
uncertainties in the law at the time of the decision-the committee decided it would not be in the public interest to grant
special, perhaps unwise, favors merely to attract incorporation in this State. On the other hand, statutes primarily emphasizing the fiduciary duties of directors, officer, and insider shareholders, such as North Carolina and California,
could not be imported wholesale into South Carolina. Although the Committee at one time considered recommending
2. During the period of the Corporation Law Revision project, the
members of the Joint Committee were Senators Henry B. Richardson
(Chairman) and Walter J. Bristow; Representatives Wallace D. Connor
and C. Clavmon Grimes; Secretary of State 0. Frank Thornton; and
Henry C. Nelson, Jr., Esquire, and Richard M. Osbourne, Esquire, appointed by Governor Hollings.
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enactment of the Model Act without alteration, this proposal
met strong opposition, since it would not best serve the interests of a corporate law revision. The initial decision, then,
was to employ the Model Act as the framework for the new
South Carolina law, but to modify it, wherever necessary, to,
include provisions which would best serve South Carolina's
needs. This decision entailed a thorough and comprehensive
study to determine in what respects the Model Act paradigm
should be departed from. For these reasons, the Joint Committee decided not to hasten the drafting of a new corporate
law, but to take time to study the problems, and prepare a
draft law. In this respect, obviously, the problem of preparing a new corporation law was of a very different order
from that of recommending the enactment of a Uniform Securities Act.
In late 1960 and early 1961, the Joint Committee completed
its plan for the drafting of a new corporation law. First of
all, it secured the invaluable support and interest of the Judicial Council of South Carolina, chaired by the Chief Justice
of the State, and consisting of a number of prominent members of the bench and bar.3 In addition, the Joint Committee
cooperated closely with the Corporation Law Committee of
the South Carolina Bar Association, 4 whose vigorous support
was an important factor in securing enactment of the new
law. At the same time, the committee established contacts
with the Committee on Corporate Laws of the ABA's Section
of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, and their experience and views were sought and relied upon.
The working arrangements for drafting the new law were
completed when the writer was appointed as Reporter for the
Corporation Law Revision project, with his responsibilities
running both to the Joint Committee and to the Judicial
Council of South Carolina. Working almost continuously
through the summer, autumn, and winter of 1961, the Reporter concentrated upon research, study, and drafting of the
new statute. In carrying forward his task, the Reporter,
first of all, started with the Model Act section dealing with
3. The Judicial Council's Corporation Law Committee consisted of
Senator L. Marion Gressette, Dean Robert McC. Figg, Jr., and David W.
Robinson, Esquire.
4. The Bar Association Committee, chaired by Marshall T. Mays,
Esquire. included Miss Jean Galloway, John Dillard, Esquire; Frank B.
Gary. Esquire; and Thomas H. Pope, Esquire; with the able assistance of
Charles W. Knowlton, Esquire.
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a given point, and thereafter referred, on every provision of

the draft law, to the treatment of that problem in a number
of states. The states selected were California and North Carolina ("strict" jurisdictions), Connecticut and Ohio ("middle
of the road"), New York (the then latest corporation law
revision and one of the best), Delaware (the classic "liberal"
jurisdiction), and Virginia (chiefly Model Act). In addition,
on specific problems, the statutes of many other states and
of England and some Commonwealth countries were constantly consulted.
Secondly, following the research and preparation of an
initial draft of a proposed section, together with more or less
extensive notes explaining the draft section, the Reporter
followed the practice of sending these materials to a selected
group with whom he maintained constant contact. The sections so distributed were grouped around the traditional topics of a corporation code: e.g., directors, shareholders, dividends, etc., and were distributed in this form to the consultants. They included the members of the Joint Committee,
the Judicial Council, and the South Carolina Bar Association
Committee on Corporate Law. The comments and views of
all were invited, and their criticisms and suggestions were,
whenever received, carefully evaluated and often incorporated
into the draft version of the new law.
Thirdly, the South Carolina revisers were especially fortunate in having the opportunity for lengthy consultation with
members of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the ABA
Section, at a meeting in New York late in October 1961. This
meeting involved a frank and full exchange of views on corporation law generally, and a searching criticism and analysis
of the then drafted provisions of the South Carolina law. Although there were points of unresolved disagreement, nonetheless the discussion was perhaps the most helpful which
the South Carolina revisers had during the long process of
drafting the new law.
Finally, late in 1961, when the initial draft of the new law
had been completed, the mimeographed sections were collected and printed in a 268 page document which set forth the
statutory text and the Reporter's Notes on each of the sections
of the draft law. This printed version was widely circulated
both in and out of South Carolina, and prompted a variety
of suggestions and recommendations for the bill which was
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to be introduced into the Legislature when it convened in
January, 1962. Indeed one purpose served by the printed draft
version was to draw the fire of critics and others before introducing the statute into the Legislature, and thereby speed
the bill through the General Assembly, as was in fact the
case.
After the printed draft had been circulated, the Bar Association sponsored two institutes on the new corporation law,
held at the University of South Carolina Law School. The
institutes were the occasions for long sessions of hard work
by prominent and experienced corporation law attorneys.
Each attorney was assigned in advance to a chapter of the
new statute and given responsibility for evaluation and criticism of the provisions contained in the statute. Since criticism was the objective, there was obviously no effort to select
attorneys who would be favorable to any or all of the provisions of the corporation law. The result of these discussions
were a variety of penetrating suggestions, many of which
were then incorporated in the final draft of the act to be introduced into the Legislature. 5
The new statute, sponsored by the Joint Committee and
recommended for adoption by the Judicial Council with the
backing of the Executive Committee of the Bar Association,
was unanimously passed by the Senate, and then by the House
of Representatives with only three technical amendments
from the floor.6 On March 30, 1962, the enrolled bill was
signed by the Governor.
B.

Guidelines in Drafting the New Law.

Any major law revision, and in particular a corporation
law, represents a judgment on balancing a number of factors.
5. A number of the participants in the Institute have contributed
articles to this Symposium issue. In the order in which their articles appear, they are William H. Blackwell, Esquire; Charles W. Knowlton,
Esquire; Julian J. Nexsen, Esquire; David L. Freeman, Esquire; Thomas
K. Johnstone, Jr., Esquire; and Augustine T. Smythe, Jr., Esquire.
6. Three amendments to the Corporation Law were proposed from
the floor of the House of Representatives; and were adopted: (1) The
specific provision in Section 8.17(b) that any loan to directors or officers
carry the going rate of interest and adequate security; (2) The provision in Section 6.27(k) permitting a derivative suit to survive although
the plaintiff shareholder has dissented to corporate action and applied
for payment of his shares; and (3) The requirement in Section 10.3(b) (3)
that shareholders who are asked to approve a merger or consolidation be
furnished balance sheets and profit and loss statements for the preceding
thmee -7ears.
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The judgment may be explicit and based upon careful consideration of these various factors and the weight to be attached to them; or it may be implicit, emerging only after
the work has been completed and therefore rationalizing a
result. In drafting a corporation law, the more obvious factors include the need to assure corporate management maximum flexibility in operating the enterprise, protection o
the rights of shareholders, and the distinctive needs of the
close corporation. As is inevitably the case when a judgment
must be made on balancing many competing considerations,
each worthy of attention, there is a wide range of possible
balances which might be struck.
Revision of the South Carolina law was greatly aided by
five basic guidelines which were consciously and explicitly
formulated early in the research and drafting process. These
guidelines largely overlap; alone they afford no ground of
choice when competing considerations are in conflict; and
therefore they leave a wide area of choice. The experience of
the South Carolina revisors, however, was that they did what
they were supposed to do: that is, to call attention to the
major considerations in drafting an up-to-date statute fairly
adjusting the interests involved in corporate enterprise. By
gauging each statutory provision, and the statute as a whole,
against these considerations, it was possible to obtain a perspective on the new law. Each of these guidelines is discussed briefly.
(1)
The necessity of securing for all corporations the
maximum flexibility in corporate action, consistent with the
rights of shareholders. For the public issue corporation, this
meant that management should have as much freedom as
possible in handling the problems of a business which may
be nationwide or even worldwide in scope. In the case of the
close corporation, this guideline dictated special provisions
which would permit the corporation and its shareholders,
who are normally its directors and officers, to act almost as
freely as if they were in partnership with respect to the
internal affairs of a corporation. In both instances, this objective is embodied in statutory declarations of a rule of law
which prevails unless modified, or negated by a provision,
which the new law permits to appear in the articles of incor•poration, or occasionally in the by-laws. In consequence, the
yew statute is replete, to a degree greater than most present
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corporate law revisions, with permissive provisions. The result is to give the businessman, whether large or small, and
his attorneys, the opportunity to fashion the corporate enterprise which, in his judgment, best fits his needs.
A second guideline was to make the Business Cor(2)
poration Act, as far as possible, self-contained. Although the
new law does not purport to be a code in the sense that it
covers every possible corporate situation, with the objective
of making unnecessary recourse to case law, nonetheless it
seeks to solve in advance and directly from the statutory text
as many corporate law problems as possible among those
which might arise. It was, of course, recognized, as it must
necessarily be, that even the most complete code cannot be
wholly self-explanatory. This approach was also in part
shaped by South Carolina's experience with its prior corporation law which was chiefly deficient because of gaps,
ambiguities and uncertainties. Among the provisions which
especially reflect this objective of self-containment are the
sections governing proxies, including irrevocable proxies,
shareholder voting and management agreements, and a section setting forth canons of construction for preferred shares.
(3) A third basic guideline was to provide for the needs
of the closely held corporation. In this respect the South
Carolina law follows the trend of recent corporation laws,
beginning with North Carolina's 1955 statutory provisions
governing closely held corporations, and developed especially
in Connecticut and New York. Some consideration was given
to the possibility of drafting a separate statute for the closely
held corporation, but the revisors rejected the considerable
effort of defining the closely-held corporation so as to distinguish it from corporations subject only to the general corporation law. Although such a definition has been used for
several sections of the South Carolina law, 7 it is one thing
to formulate a definition for such limited use, and quite another matter to devise a definition determinative of the application of the provisions of one or another statute. In all
events, the South Carolina law gives particular attention to
the close corporation, on the theory that here, as in other
states, the small corporation is now and will long continue
7. Two provisions are specifically limited to close corporations, 'viz.
Sections 6.22(b) (agreements permitting shareholders directly to manage
corporate affairs) and 12.14 (agreements giving certain shareholders an
option to have the corporation dissolved).
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to be the most prevalent type of corporate enterprise in this
.State. More specifically, the new statute explicitly recognizes that most small corporations are no more than incorporated partnerships, that is, enterprises in which the shareholder-operators are partners inter se with limited liability
vis-a-vis third persons.
(4) The new corporation law makes careful provision for
the protection of shareholders and especially minority, preferred, and non-voting shareholders, thus carrying forward
the traditional South Carolina solicitude for shareholder interests. Indeed, ignoring this would have been fatal to any
corporation law revision in this State. In line with this objective, and also with the desire for self-containment and
completeness, the new statute has, for example, codified the
duty of directors and officers, and has also specified a special standard for those cases, especially frequent in the small
corporation, involving transactions between corporate insiders and their corporation.$ The proxy provisions already
mentioned are similarly designed to protect shareholders at
that point where his interests are most likely to be compromised. In this connection, a special problem was presented
by the local constitutional requirement of cumulative voting.
Although the draft version of the new law would have made
cumulative voting permissive rather than mandatory,9 opposition was so vigorous that cumulative voting was left mandatory, but with special provisions that clarify the indefinite
contours of the cumulative voting right 0 as expressed in
the old law.
(5) Finally, it should never be forgotten that, after all,
a corporation law is largely designed to facilitate local business and to protect local shareholder and other interests. A
corollary to this, and one of the assumptions upon which the
South Carolina corporation law revision proceeded was that
the new statute should not be used as a business-solicitation
device. Although loose standards would undoubtedly attract
some marginal enterprises into the State, the price would be
too great to pay. Hence, the revisers refused, to paraphrase
Judge Learned Hand's famous phrase, to be haunted by the
ghost of the corporation excluded or fleeing the jurisdiction,
recognizing that such fears are often unreal dreams. Nor
8. S. o. §§8.15, 8.16.
9. DRAFT VRSION, S. C. BUS. CORP. ACT §6.20 (Supp. 1962).

10. S. C. §6.20(b).
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would it have been realistic to suppose that, even with a loosely drawn statute, enterprises would have likely changed their
state of incorporation. For example, the attractions of Delaware and other traditional corporate domiciles lie not only in
the freedom of corporate management, but also in such less
tangible considerations as the certainty of the law, the quality of the courts which enforce the law, and the receptiveness
of the legislature to new ideas. Thus, excessive and unwisely
granted privileges would not attract corporations from an
established domicile. Rather, were South Carolina to strain
after such an objective, the effect might be to import enterprises expecting, under the cloak of "management discretion,"
to engage in practices oppressive to shareholders and detrimental to the public. Shunning that attraction, which must
always stand as a lure to any corporate law revisers, the new
statute took as its objective the simple one of preparing a law
which would have maximum utility and value to legitimate
business wishing to domesticate and operate in the State.
Happily the law which achieves this objective is also the law
which is most attractive to sound business.
III.

ORGANIZING THE CORPORATION

Whatever the need for complexity or detail in other branches of corporation law, there is no justification for burdening
the incorporation process with useless formalities and other
requirements productive of delay, inconvenience, or worse. It
is indeed a reproach to early corporation laws that they
should have set up conditions in the incorporation process
which so frequently resulted in the embarrassment and abortiveness of the de facto corporation. The former South Carolina corporation law is an instance. Here the incorporation
process was enmeshed with statutory mandates regulating
the raising of capital by subscriptions before filing the incorporation papers, by requirements of advance newspaper notices of incorporation and finally, by ambiguous provisions
for filing with both the Secretary of State and the county
clerk."
Requirements and complexities such as these derive historically from opposition to corporate ventures and fears of
11. Indeed, one section of prior law [S. C. CODE §12-60 (Supp. 1962)]

was at least open to a construction which would require a corporation to
record its incorporation papers (and presumably all other documents of
like character) with the clerk of court of every county in which the
corporation might do business.
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the economic and political power of consolidated capital.
These fears no longer control. Today it is, or at least should
be, accepted that the corporation is a, if not the, normal form
of doing business, and that it should be available as a matter
of right for any person who is able to comply with simple
minimum requirements for incorporation. For this reason,
the South Carolina statute, like the Model Act, seeks to simplify as far as possible the incorporation process, and to
eliminate needless technicalities.
A. Who May Incorporate: The new South Carolina law
departs from the Model Act 2 and, indeed, from the corresponding provisions of most corporation laws,13 by the explicit authorization for "[o]ne or more persons, having capacity to contract" to organize a corporation. 14 This provision, first of all, lays at rest any possible doubt as to the
validity of the one-man corporation' 5 by recognizing it, in the
most emphatic way, as a separate and distinct legal entity
whose limited liability is not forfeited by the fact that all the
stock is held at all times by a single person. Not only is the
one-man enterprise the logical working-out of the legal separation of the shareholder and his corporation, but because
it is a permanent part of the corporate scene it should have
full legal recognition.' 6 Secondly, authorizing a single incorporator avoids the present ritual of recruiting "dummy" incorporators from law office or client personnel. Quaint and
pleasant as this time-honored liturgy may be, it is hardly
worth mandatory perpetuation through a statutory requirement, as is the case in most states.
The same provision also has another interesting feature.
By its use of the term "person," it follows from the definition of that term 7 that non-natural persons, including partnerships or other corporations, may be incorporators. The
12. MODEL ACT §47.
13. Some states are substituting a single for former multiple incorporators, e.g., New York (N. Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §401) and the new
Iowa statute (§48) continuing the long-standing and evidently satisfactory
prior Iowa law (IowA CODE §491.2).
14. S. C. §4.2.
15. Note the surprising invglidation of a one-man corporation under

former North Carolina law (which required, inter alia, three incorporators,
three directors, three officers), in Park Terrace, Inc. v Phoenix Indem. Co.,

241 N. C. 473, 85 S. E. 2d 677 (1955), affd on rehearing, 243 N. C. 595,
91 S. E. 2d 584 (1956), overruled by N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-3.1 (1960).
16.

Compare S. C. §8.3(a) which permits a one-man "board of direc-

tors" for a one-man corporation.
17. S. C. §1.2 (a).
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new Iowa corporation law,"s for example, has done this, and
it seems a perfectly sound procedure. 19 It recognizes that
corporations are often the real party in interest, especially in
forming subsidiary or affiliated corporations or corporate
joint ventures. Moreover, corporations, especially banks, are
not debarred from performing the fiduciary duties of trustees; and indeed under the Federal Trust Indenture Act of
1939, two trustees-one of whom must be a corporationare required for every indenture under which certain creditor
securities are issued.20
The incorporation process itself is completed when the inecorporators execute, acknowledge, and file the articles of in,corporation. In accordance with the general filing procedure,
,corporate existence begins immediately as of the date en,dorsed by the Secretary of State on the articles of incorporation.2 1 Like the Model Act, and unlike present South Carolina law,22 raising capital is not a condition precedent to
incorporation, although it is necessary before the corporation
begins to do business, aside from expenses of organizing the
23
corporation and obtaining subscriptions or share payments.
Similarly, the organization meeting follows the corporation's
birth, like the Model Act but unlike prior South Carolina
24

law.

B. Articles of Incorporation
Section 4.3 of the South Carolina statute contains a fuller
statement respecting the contents of the articles of incorporation than does Model Act Section 48. This is not designed to
make the drafting of the articles more complex, but to bring
home to the attorney that he has the fullest freedom, consistent with the statute, to utilize provisions which will suit
the particular, perhaps unusual, needs of his client.2 5 Section
18. IowA Bus. CORP. AcT §§48 ("One or more persons as defined in this

Act . . .") and 2(1) ("person" includes a corporation, partnership, association, etc.).

19. It may be clumsy for a corporation to act as incorporator, since

it must do so through natural persons; and under the South Carolina
law, presumably they would be the persons entitled and required to execute corporate documents under the general provision (S. C. §1.4) for

executing documents.

20. §310(a), 15 U. S. C. §77jjj (a).
21. Implied in the general language of S. C. §1.6, it is specifically reaffirmed in the chapter on corporate organization in S. C. §4.4,
22. S. C. CODE §12-58(7), 12-58(9) (1952).
23. S. C. §4.6(a); MODEL ACT §51.
24. Compare S. C. §4.7 and MODEL ACT §52 with S. C. CODE §12-58 (8)
(1952).
25. S. C. §4.3 (a) (8).
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4.3 thus places beyond doubt the validity of provisions which
have in some states given rise to a charge that they violate
the terms of the statute by deviating from a supposed "corporate norm." Such clear authority is also important because
it ties in with the numerous statutory provisions which declare a rule of law "except as otherwise provided by the articles" or "subject to the articles" or similar language authorizing the draftsman to deviate from some flat rule of law in
26
the interests of a flexible approach for his client.
Here, a linguistic point is worth noting. The language
of the Model Act, sections 48(d) and (f), setting forth
all-important provisions as to the number and type (par or
no-par) of shares, and classes and series, if any, is unnecessarily intricate and involved. Section 4.3 (b) of the South
Carolina statute, retains the substance of this material, but
makes it more understandable by breaking down some of the
lengthy provisions into short sentences divided, where necessary, into clearly marked clauses. 27 Indeed, there are other
instances where the Model Act is characterized by an undue
complexity of statutory language28which can be simplified for
the sake of clarity and precision.
C.

Minimum Capital Requirement

A vexing problem in any corporation law revision is the
decision whether or not to require that any capital be paid
in before business is begun. There is a sound argument for
not requiring any statutory minimum of capital. On the one
hand, an amount large enough to do any good would prove
intrinsically unworkable and would probably drive many
corporations out of the state. On the other hand a nominal
capital does not of itself assure the financial soundness of
the enterprise. For this reason one may well applaud Virginia
and North Carolina, 9 otherwise so diametrically opposed in
their approach to corporation law, for the practical logic of
their decision to require no specified minimum capital pay26. Like MoiEL ACT §48, S. C. §§2.2 (b) and 4.3 (e) protect the articles
from the temptation, succumbed to by attorneys in some states, to recite

all the statutory powers of the corporation.
27. S. C.'§§4.3(a) (7), 4.3(6).
-28. A notable example is MTODEL ACT §74, especially paragraph 5. For
efforts at clarifying this procedure, see S. C. §6.27, and N. Y. Bus. CoRP.
ACT §623.
29. Compare N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-9

(1960)

and VA. CODE §13.1-53

(1956).
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ment before the business is started. This approach is consistent with the financial soundness and integrity of the corporation since there are, apart from any legal requirements,
many economic and business pressures upon the incorporators
to bring sufficient capital into the business at the outset.
Under the common law, of course, a corporation may lose its
limited liability in the case of gross inadequacy of capital relative to the corporate operations.
With some variations, South Carolina follows the Model
Act section on this point. Thus, section 4.6 requires payment
of a minimum of $1000 before the corporation begins to do
business. Since $1000 is hardly adequate in any real sense,
and since there is no assurance that even this small amount
will remain in the corporation, 30 the theory presumably is
that the compulsory payment of this sum may deter promiscuous incorporation. Perhaps it may induce persons to think
twice before incorporating; certainly, the figure is not so
high as to be any hindrance to business. If this, then, is the
theory, as the South Carolina revisers conceived it to be, then
it can be carried a step further by requiring that one-half of
this minimum be received in actual cash. This is intended to
insure that some liquid funds, as distinguished from possibly
unsaleable property, will actually come into the corporation
before it launches its business. This $500 cash requirement,
even more than the $1000 minimum consideration requirement of the Model Act, should deter the fly-by-night enterprise. The minimum consideration requirement is also
strengthened by a provision that persons transacting business
in violation of the capital requirements section shall be jointly
and severally liable for the debts and liabilities of the corporation which arise out of such business. These requirements, so
the South Carolina revisers believed, were desirable to counterbalance the ease of incorporation by a single person.
Practical considerations also dictated adopting a small capital requirement as against the more logical step of dropping
the capital requirement. The old law had an unwieldy and
complex requirement that the corporation, even before applying for incorporation, have subscriptions for at least fifty per30. Thus, the directors may allocate most of the consideration for
no-par shares to capital surplus (S. C. §5.13(c)) which is available for
distribution to shareholders if certain conditions are met. (S. C. §5.16;
MODE . ACT §41.) In all events, stated capital may be reduced, and that
reduction surplus is capital surplus. S. C. §§5.21 and 5.22(f); MODELr
ACT §§63 and 64 (first paragraph),

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/2

14

1963]

Folk:
The Model
andTHE
the South
29Law
CORP. Corporation
LAW
THE
MODEL
ACT Act
AND
S. C.Carolina

cent of its authorized shares and receive at least twenty percent of the amount subscribed.3 1 Surprisingly, many persons
judged this capital payment requirement to be an important
safeguard. The substitution of a $1000 consideration requirement is in large measure a substitute for this archaic statutory provision which, consistently evaded by the practice of
paying in a small authorized share capital and thereafter
raising it to the desired level without having to meet the
50-20% requirement as to the increase, nonetheless placed
South Carolina at a disadvantage relative to other states
whose laws were not saddled with this arachronism. However, it may well be recognized, as South Carolina business
develops under the twin aegis of its new corporation and the
Uniform Securities Act, that no minimum capital requirement is needed, and that protection of the public interest in
the marketing of shares and other means of raising capital
is best achieved through the securities laws rather than
through the corporation law.
Role of the Secretatry of State in the
Incorporation Process
Section 4.4 is a special provision addressed to the Secretary
of State setting forth determinations which he must make
before he accepts the articles for filing, thereupon initiating
corporate existence as of the date he endorses the articles.
This provision is exclusive. Not only is this a convenience to
the Secretary of State and his office personnel, but it is assurance, written into law, of the attorney's freedom to insert
into the articles of incorporation provisions which he thinks
will best serve his client. It precludes any administrative
officer from striking novel provisions as a condition for
filing, thereby exercising a veto right over the content of the
articles. The assumption here is that flexibility in planning
the corporation outweighs the possibility that articles may be
filed with provisions contrary to the act--an abuse for which
there are adequate remedies. Hence, under the South Carolina law, the Secretary of State must file the articles once he
has determined:
(1) That the incorporators have complied with the formalities of executing, acknowledging and delivering the articles for filing and have paid the appropriate fees;
D.

31. S. C. CODE §12-58 (1952).
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That the articles set forth the minimum items of in-

formation specifically required by statute. This is essentially
a ministerial duty, since the Secretary of State is not expected to go behind the assertions made in the articles of incorporation, but only to see that the requisite information appears. It is contemplated that he should do no more than
ask whether and why a particular item of information that is
required has been left out; and if he is assured that the point
is inapplicable to the particular corporation, his function at
this point is at an end.
(3) The Secretary is to determine whether the corporate
name assumed by the enterprise is in accord with the corporate name requirements of the act, viz. whether or not the
proposed corporation is assuming a name already registered
or reserved, and thus accords protection to other corporations
which rely on the registration and reservation of name provisions.
Beyond performing these essentially ministerial duties, he
has nothing else to do than to file the articles. These specific
provisions, then, are of benefit both to the Secretary of State,
82
to the business which is incorporating, and to its attorney.
IV.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CORPORATION LAW

The practice under the Model Act is to state in full the
execution and filing procedures in each section which requires a corporation document to be filed with the Secretary
of State. This procedure, of course, accords with the Model
Act policy of eliminating or at least minimizing cross-references within the statute; and certainly no one could argue
that any statute should be burdened with the complex crossreferences characteristic of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 or the complicated dependence of the Securities Act of
1933 upon its initial definitions. But the procedure used in
the Model Act does carry the disadvantage of constant repetition of presumably identical material.3 3 Both from the stand32. He also notes that the attorney's certificate required by S. C.

§4.3 (d) accompanies the articles (S. C. §4.4(d)).

33. Thus identical, or substantially identical, material appears at

MODEL ACT §§49 (articles of incorporation), .56 (articles of amendment),

59 (restated articles of incorporation), 61 (cancellation of redeemable
shares), 62 (cancellation of other reacquired shares), 63 (reduction of
stated capital), 68 (articles of merger or consolidation), 68A (short form
mergers), 75 (voluntary dissolution by incorporators), 78 (statement of
intent to dissolve), 83 (revocation of voluntary dissolution proceedings),
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point of the lawyer and the personnel of the Secretary of
State's office, complete accuracy and safety would require
that each time a document is prepared or is offered for filing,
the execution and filing provisions applicable to that particular document must be consulted and studied for assurance
that the precise procedure has been followed. Apart from this
consideration, in general provisions such as those appearing
in the South Carolina law, it is possible to speak with much
greater detail-to the advantage of both attorney and Secretary of State-than would be feasible if the execution and
filing requirements must be repeated some 15 or 20 times in
the course of the act.
For these reasons, the new South Carolina act, like most
new corporate laws, sets forth, in three sections in the initial
chapter of the act a fully uniform procedure for executing,
verifying, and filing all corporate documents required to be
filed with the Secretary of State. This uniform procedure
also has the endorsement of the Secretary of State who will
administer the law in this State. Each section which requires public filing of a document makes a clear and specific
cross-reference to these initial sections, thereby eliminating
the repetition of material which is or should be identical.
The first of these general sections34 requires the execution
of one original and one conformed copy of each document. It
then specifies the officers or other persons who are to sign
the documents, with sufficient detail to insure that no document will be invalid solely for want of an authorized person
to sign it. Both copies of the document are delivered for
filing to the Secretary of State.35 Upon receiving the documents and the required fees and taxes, he then files the document and certifies the filing of the original document by an
endorsement upon its face. The filed copy thus endorsed is
a convenient substitute for the formal certificate which under
the Model Act the Secretary of State must usually issue; indeed, it is the certificate for all purposes. Also because the
endorsement must be exactly dated, 6 this eliminates any
question as to the exact time when the document was filed,
86 (articles of dissolution), 104 (application for authority of foreign
corporation to do business in state), 113 (application of foreign corporation to withdraw).
34. S. C. §1.4.
35. S. C. §1.6. There is also a simple and uniform procedure specified
in S. C. §1.5 for verification of documents.
36. S. C. §1.6(a) (3).
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and is thus conducive to certainty. Vitiated only by showing
actual fraud, the filing section conclusively presumes that
any document becomes fully effective as of the filing date
endorsed on the document, and the transaction is deemed to
be consummated as of that date.U
The new South Carolina Corporation Law, like the Model
Act, does not presently require that documents filed with the
Secretary be also filed with the clerk of court of any county.
As a consequence, no question arises as to the completeness
of the action represented by the filed document. In its draft
version,3 8 the new law did require local filing, but set up a
streamlined procedure by which the Secretary of State on
receiving two copies of the document, would collect both his
own and the clerk's fee and forward to the clerk both his fee
and a copy of the document. Although eliminated in the
bill introduced into the General Assembly, its restoration, in
the form originally intended, is likely, since many members
of the bar wish to have a copy of these public documents
locally available. But, requiring the Secretary to assume
responsibility for transmitting the second copy to the county
clerk, would doubtlessly preclude any de facto corporation
problems, especially since the document automatically becomes fully effective as of its filing date.
Aside from his powers and duties under the filing provisions, the Secretary of State has the usual authority in administering the corporation law, and on these points the South
Carolina statute largely accords with the Model Act. 9 Thus,
'he functions under both statutes as an alternative agent to
receive service of process, 40 although South Carolina, unlike
the Model Act, also sets out a specific procedure by which foreign corporations doing business without authority in the
State automatically designate the Secretary as an agent.4 1
There are also specific requirements that the Secretary keep
and maintain current lists of all corporate names, 42 and of
37. S. C. §1.6 (b).

38. DRAFT VERsioN, S. C. BUS. CORP. ACT §§1.6(a) (2), (6)-(7), and

(c).

39. See, e.g., S. C. §14.3 and MODEL ACT §133 (general grant of powers
to Secretary); S. C. §§14.4-14.5 and MODEL AcT §§130-131 (interrogatories
by Secretary of State).
40. S. C. §3.6 (b) and MODEL ACT §13.
41. S. C. §13.14. S. C. §3.7 also continues a traditional local procedure
for service of process on the Secretary of State in any suit against a
non-resident director "relating to actions of" the corporation of which
he was a director and "arising while he held office" as director.
42. S. C. §3.1 (f).
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the location of each corporation's registered office and the
name and address of its registered agent.43 Additionally, the
Secretary performs a role in administering the provisions of
the South Carolina law, 44 not duplicated in the Model Act, for

dissoluton by charter forfeiture of corporations which fail to
file annual reports, pay franchise taxes, or maintain a registered agent.
V.

BOOKS AND RECORDS

South Carolina, like the Model Act, requires that each corporation keep full and complete books and records of account.45 Both statutes also require the corporation to mail to
any shareholder, on request, a copy of the latest balance sheet,
"showing in reasonable detail" the corporation's financial
condition as of the close of its fiscal year, and a profit and
loss statement of its operations during that year.46 Certainly,
it is desirable that these documents be readily available, both
to keep the shareholders informed as to the operations of
,the corporation, and because so many of the statutory requirements speak in accounting terms. The South Carolina
statute, however, also requires that the corporation keep at
its registered office copies of both the current financial statements as well as those for the preceding ten years or for such
shorter period as the corporation may have been in existence. 47 These documents are available for inspection by any
shareholder as a matter of right. This provision is important
because it makes it possible for the shareholder to compare
current with past financial statements. The availability of
past financial statements, without delay or condition, is especially important to the new shareholder who has 'not had a
'chance to accumulate over a period of time the various past
-financial statements with which to make a comparison of the
present statements. This statutory mandate is comparable to
the requirement that corporations having securities listed on
national exchanges show comparative figures which are most
-revealing as to the corporation's health. Apart from fairness
43. S. C. §3.4(b), S. C. §3.6(c), and MODEL ACT §13; both require the
Secretary to keep lists of processes served on him as agent.
44. S. C. §§12.11-12.12.
45. S. C. §6.25 (a); MODEL ACT §46, par. 1.
46. S. C. §6.25(c); MODEL ACT §46, last par. The South Carolina

provision requires the statements to be prepared "[n]ot later than five
months after the close of each fiscal year."
47. S. C. §6.25(c).
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to shareholders, there is a good reason for furnishing shareholders with sufficient information rather than erecting
roadblocks. Such protection encourages the flow of funds into
corporate enterprise by persons who have at least the assurance that they can readily obtain some information bearing on
the status of their investment and the financial facts pertinent
to that question. One would suppose that the ready availability of information regarding listed stocks, required by the
Securites Exchange Act of 1934, has played no small part in
promoting investment by persons who would otherwise not
have ventured into the money markets. The availability of
such information should similarly promote the flow of local
funds into local enterprises, not subject to the broad disclosure of the affairs of listed corporations.
Other documents must be kept on file by the corporationfor inspection by any shareholder. These include a current.
copy of the by-laws and also a fully conformed copy of everydocument required by the act to be filed with the Secretary
of State.48 Since a conformed copy must in all events be delivered to and endorsed by the Secretary of State when he
files the original copy, this proves no burden. In essence, it
is the equivalent to making available for shareholder inspection the formal certificate issued by the Secretary of State
under the Model Act procedure. The net effect, then, is that
the corporation must maintain at its registered office certain
basic documents bearing upon the financial condition, authorty, and activities of the corporation, and these documents and
information must be furnished to any shareholder on request
at business hours.
All documents and papers, other than those specifically required to be kept at the registered office and to be made
available on demand by any shareholder, are subject to the
general provisions relating to shareholders' inspection rights.
49
Here the South Carolina law follows the Model Act, with

various additions which are designed to protect the corpora,
tion. Like the Model Act the shareholder entitled to inspect
corporate books must be one who has been a record holder for
at least six months; but unlike the Model Act provision, this
right extends also to one who has five percent of the outstanding shares of any class, or who with other shareholders
48 S. C. §6.25(d).
49. Compare S. C. §6.26 with MODEL ACT §46.
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comprises the required five percent of any class of stock. The
South Carolina revisers saw no reason for the Model Act's
unusually strict requirement that the five percent holder
must be measured against the corporation's total number of
shares outstanding. This is particularly harsh in the case,
not unknown, of the holder of a relatively small class of preferred shares, particularly because even the entire number of
preferred shares of a given class might not comprise five percent of the outstanding shares of all classes, and the shareholder would be automatically denied inspection rights. Yet,
it is often in the case of a preferred shareholder that protection may be most needed.
With this provision designed to insure fairness, both the
South Carolina and the Model Act seek to isolate and exclude
the "strike" shareholder or the unscrupulous competitor using
a few shares of stock in the corporation to gain access to the
corporate books. The procedure used, however, is different.
Under the Model Act,50 the officer or agent who refuses a
shareholder's inspection demand must pay a ten percent penalty and any other damages resulting from his refusal; but
when sued, the officer may defend on the ground that the
shareholder, within a specified period of time, had sold a list
of shareholders or aided others in doing so or had improperly
used information obtained from corporate books. The South
Carolina law takes a different approach here, derived from
the recent New York Act.A First of all, the corporation or
its transfer agent or registrar may deny inspection if the
shareholder refuses to furnish an affidavit that the inspection
52
is not for an improper purpose, defined as in the Model Act.
Any shareholder who has a legitimate purpose and nothing
to hide would normally file the affidavit without protest, save
perhaps as a point of honor. However, if inspection is denied
for failure to file the affidavit, the validity of such refusal is
tested, not in a penalty suit, but when the shareholder on his
own seeks a court order for inspection.5" Under a show cause
procedure, the corporation explains its denial of inspection.
This procedure may result in any appropriate judgment
granting, denying, limiting, or otherwise conditioninp, the
shareholder's right of inspection. The court would pre50.
51.
52.
53.

MODEL ACT §46, p~ar. 3.
Compare S. C. §6.26(c)-(d) with N. Y. Bus. CORP. ACT §624(c).
S. C. -6.26(c).
S. C. §6.26(d).
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sumably have discretion to appoint impartial individuals to
inspect the corporate books for the information sought by
the shareholder, and thus deny a shareholder the right to fish
through the corporate books. As under the Model Act, the
shareholder may inspect as of right only the books and records of account; to examine minutes of the board of directors
or the executive committee, or reports and memoranda by
officers and others in the corporation, and like documents,
he must obtain a court order, 54 and the act contemplates that
the corporation could absolutely refuse such inspection unless
and until ordered by the court to produce.
Finally, the South Carolina law, considering especially the
needs of shareholders of local corporations, may order books
of a domestic corporation brought into the state for inspection in the state.55 However, this can be done only through
a court order, and there is a carefully prescribed power of
the court to ease the burden on the corporation by authorizing it to bring into the state in lieu of books or other documents, "pertinent extracts therefrom or duly authenticated
copies thereof." This recognizes the sound view of an early
decision in this state that if the books of a domestic corporation could be kept in New York, as they were there, "they
can be kept in California or Calcutta," so that "the statute
could be circumvented and rendered of no avail by keeping
5 6 This represents
the books beyond the limits of the state."1
an effort to strike a balance between the legitimate interests
of local shareholders of a domestic corporation inspecting the
necessary documents and papers within the state, and on the
other hand the undeniable interest of a corporation in legitimately keeping its books at the center of its financial or industrial operations.
The new South Carolina law requires few formalities for
meetings of shareholders and directors, and does not attempt
to specify, beyond broad categories, the types of minutes and
other records which should be kept. For example, it validates
action taken by shareholders and directors without a meeting.57 But the new statute does give every encouragement to
corporations to keep and maintain records of their activities.
54. S. C. §6.26(f).

55. S. C. §6.26(e).
56. Self v. Langley Mills, Inc., 123 S. C. 179, 190, 115 S. E. 54 (1922).
57. S. C. §6.18 (shareholders); S. C. §8.12 (directors). MODEL ACT
§188, validates only informal or irregular shareholder action.
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The most notable section 58 in this respect provides that the
facts recited in certain corporate documents "shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein." These include
minutes of meetings of shareholders, directors, committees,
and various documents evidencing consent or waiver which
are filed with the minutes. In order for the documents to
have such an effect, they must be certified under oath of the
president and of the secretary to be true and correct. This
section should be a powerful inducement to corporations to
maintain full and complete documents of their activities. On
the other hand, if a document is not available or minutes were
not kept, the corporate action taken is not invalid; but the
problems of proof remain at the usual level of difficulty because the corporation is not able to take advantage of the
section's prima facie rule. Another provisionP9 similarly
should encourage record-keeping by a corporation. This section codifies the prevailing American law as to transactions
between directors and corporations, including a provision
that no transacton in which a director is involved is void or
voidable solely because he is present or participated in the
meeting or his vote is counted if material facts as to his
interest and the transaction are disclosed to the directors and
are noted in the minutes of the meeting. 60 The objective
throughout has been to encourage, by giving incentives to,
the corporation to keep minutes; but not at the same time to
penalize the loosely run corporation for its failure, so common in smaller enterprises, to keep minutes and documents
according to accepted corporate etiquette.
VI.
A.

DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

A Corporate Norm: The Board of Directors

The new South Carolina law closely follows the Model Act
in treating directors and officers athough it contains a number of additional and supplementary provisions.
Like the Model Act,61 the South Carolina statute 2 envisions
as the "corporate norm" that "the business and affairs of a
corporation shall be managed by a board of directors"; but
58. S. C. §14.9, derived from CoNN. GZN. STATs. §38416.

59. S. C. §8.16.
60. There are other grounds for validating a transaction between a
corporation and an interested director. S. C. §8.16.
61. MoDEL AcT §33.
62. S. C. §8.1,
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much more than the Model Act, it legitimates departures
from this standard of director control. Thus, section 8.1
makes the general mandate "subject to any provision permitted by this act to be contained in the articles of incorporation,
the by-laws, or agreements among shareholders." The "subject to" clause thus ties in with innumerable provisions validating deviations from a statutory standard, especially by
authorizing the corporation to handle its business and affairs
other than by action of the board of directors. The deviation
may be merely a matter of form: South Carolina, unlike the
Model Act, expressly authorizes informal director action
without a meeting if certain conditions are met.63 Or, more

importantly, the variation from the "corporate norm" may
be one of substance. In the small corporation, for instance,
day-to-day affairs are often managed directly by the shareholders, in contrast to the larger corporation whose day-today business is handled invariably by the directors and, in
the largest, by compact executive and finance committees of
directors and officers devoting full or nearly full time to the
corporate business. Hence, various provisions recognize, on
the one hand, the broad powers which may be delegated to
executive and other committees ;64 and, on the other, the extensive power under the South Carolina law of shareholders
to control action of directors.6 5 Such permissible deviations
from the grant of power to directors are thus examples of
director action which may be "subject to" provisions of the
statute and of the articles, in order to accommodate the widely divergent interests represented by the various groups
which incorporate.
One may ask why not go all the way and permit the articles
to abolish the board of directors altogether. 66 In many corporations, the board of directors is little more than a statutory formality, while all of the business is handled by the
shareholders (who elect themselves directors if they elect
anyone at all). Section 8.1 of the South Carolina law does not
specifically authorize the corporation draftsman to abolish
the board of directors; but there is no clear mandate in the
new South Carolina law with which such abolition would be
inconsistent. There is a calculated reason for this equivocal
63. S. C. §8.12.
64. S. C.§8.11; Of. MODEL ACT §38.
65. S. C. §6.22.

66. See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors:
A CorporateAnachronism, 27 U. CM. L. REv. 696 (1960).
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position. On the one hand, the new law is reluctant to lay
down a rigid prohibition which might throttle a line of development of the close corporation, especially since the statute
has otherwise been so solicitious of the interests of small
enterprises. On the other hand, there is no reason to encourage a situation in which there is, as is so often true in smaller
enterprises, an enhanced likelihood of undue confusion between corporate and personal business affairs; undeniably,
the board of directors, and ancillary formalities, does serve
some purpose in underscoring the separate legal entity of the
corporation.
B.

Directors and Their Meetings

1. Number of Directors: The new South Carolina law,
like the Model Act,67 has a general requirement of three directors, but it then permits that if "all shares of a corporation are owned beneficially and of record by fewer than three
shareholders, the number of directors may be less than three
but not less than the number of shareholders.1 6 3 In this way,
the one or two man corporation need have only one or two
directors respectively, although it may have as many more
directors as it may wish. The requirement for three directors
for a one or two man corporation seems somewhat unrealistic, as the additional man may well be a figurehead at
best, a nuisance at worst. Of course, he may serve a useful function by furnishing a fresh point of view, or perhaps
even mediating conflicting interests, but the possibility that
this may occur justifies not a flat rule of law which would
require a minimum of three directors for a one or two man
corporation, but far-sighted planning by the lawyer who sets
up the corporation.
2. Increasing the Number of Director&: The South Carolina law takes a stricter view on the increase or decrease of
the number of directors than does the Model Act. Under the
Model Act, section 34, "the number of directors may be increased or decreased from time to time by amendment to the
by-laws," but under section 25 the "power to alter, amend or
repeal the by-laws or adopt new by-laws shall be vested in
the board of directors unless reserved to the shareholders by
67. MODEL ACT §34.
68. S. C. §8.3, following in substance DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §141(b),
as amended in 1961.
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the articles of incorporation." Joining these two sections, the
directors, by amending the by-laws, on their own may increase or decrease the number of-directors' seats. In the case
of a particular director who may oppose the views of the
majority of the board, there seems to be nothing to prevent
use of this device to abolish his post if it would not "shorten
[his] term." It is true that under the Model Act any directorship vacant because of an increase in the number of directors
may be filled only by the stockholders. 9 But as a practical
matter, this does not alter the centers of power, considering
the overwhelming likelihood that management nominees will
be elected. Even so, no provision is made in the case of a
decrease in the board of directors, since the shareholders
have only the opportunity to fill those posts which at the time
are vacant.
The South Carolina provision seeks to avoid this excessive
possibility of insider control by permittng the number of directors to be increased or decreased only by shareholder action, either by amendment of the articles of incorporation, or
by a by-law adopted by the shareholders, unless the board
may do so under a by-law adopted by the shareholders delegating that power to the directors.7 0 Thus the shareholders
do retain some control over the increase or decrease in the
number of members of the board of directors; and of course
under the South Carolina law, like the Model Act, the vacancy
created by an increase in the number of directors is filled only
by the shareholders.7 1
69. MODEL ACT §36.

70. S. C. §8.3 (b).
71. Section 8.7 dealing with removal of directors is not essentially different from optional Section 36A of the Model Act. The South Carolina
section differs slightly from the Model Act provision that "if less than
the entire board is to be removed no one of the directors may be removed
if the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect him if
cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board of directors." The
implication is that, if a director was elected by straight voting, although
the statute or articles require cumulative voting (and the cumulative
voting right will not be invariably exercised even when so required), that,
director may keep his seat if the votes against removal would elect him
if cumulatively voted. In effect, on removal he may enforce a right which
was waived at election. The South Carolina revisers believed that only
the director who had in fact been elected by cumulative voting should be
able to block removal under this formula. Therefore, S. C. §8.7(b) (2>
provides that "no director who has been elected by cumulative voting may
be removed if the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to
elect him if then cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board
of directors." Thus, he may be re-elected to the board if the cumulated
votes are sufficient; but in the election, all shareholders are subject to
the statute which regulates the exercise of a cumulative voting right, including (in South Carolina) the protective provisions of S. C. §6.20(b).
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3. Notice of Meetings: The South Carolina statute offers
several provisions of general interest on notice and conduct
of directors' meetings. As to special meetings of the board,
unlike the Model Act, notice must be sent "by any usual
means of communication not less than four business days
before the meeting,"7 2 unless the by-laws stipulate some other
notice procedure. Thus, the by-laws may prescribe notice of
two or three business days; and, as in the Model Act, waiver
of notice, including waiver by attending the meeting, also
relieves a corporation, which must call a hurried meeting, of
73
notice requirements.
Under the new law, attendance of a director at a meeting
automatically waives notice, without further action on his
part. The South Carolina law deals more specifically with the
director who attends a meeting solely to object to transacting
business on the ground that the meeting is unlawfully called.
Unlike the Model Act, he must announce his objection, "At
the beginning of the meeting," and if he does not object, then
74
he may not do so later.
4. Informal DirectorAction: The South Carolina law, as
already noted, validates informal action by the directors "or
members of the committee of directors without a meeting, '7 5
on the premise that suspension of formalities for shareholders (as under the Model Act) could well be allowed to directors. In order to qualify either (1) all directors or committee
members must consent in writing to the action taken, either
before or after it is taken, and file the consent with the board
minutes; or (2) it must be shown that all shareholders have
actual knowledge of the action taken, and no shareholder
made prompt objection thereto. ' 76 The latter provision in
particular applies only to closely held corporations with few
shareholders, in which case it is an easy matter of proof
Like some other states, South Carolina also provides, consistent with
its policy of arming courts with the broad remedial jurisdiction, that the
court may remove a director for 'raudulent or dishonest acts, or gross
abuse of authority or discretion in discharge of his duties to the corporation." Such jurisdiction can be invoked only by shareholders owning at
least five per cent of all outstanding shares of the corporation. S. C.
§8.7(d). Between the strict standing requirement and the statutory standard, this desirable reserve power does not threaten honest management
even if these have been business errors not adding up to breach of duty.
72. S. C. §8.9 (b).
73. S. C. §8.9 (c); Momm AcT 1 §39, 137.
74. Ib
75. S. C. §8.12.
76. S. C. §8.12 (a.
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that the shareholders actually know what the directors are
doing, especially since the directors and the shareholders are
often the same persons; indeed, it probably codifies case law

on the point 77

5. Officers: On corporate officers, the South Carolina
law offers more specific provisions than does the Model Act,
although hardly contravening its spirit. Perhaps the most
significant addition is section 8.13, now increasingly prevalent
elsewhere, that while normally elected by the directors, "if
the articles of incorporation expressly provide," the officers
may be elected by the shareholders. Section 8.14 then protects the shareholder-elected officer by allowing his removal
only by a vote of shareholders "unless the shareholders shall
have authorized the directors to remove such officer or
agent," e.g., for misconduct, or perhaps to suspend him. This
,obviously protects the corporation when a shareholder-elected
'officer should be removed, and where it would be inconvenient to call a shareholder meeting to do so. Again, under section 8.14 vacancies in offices are to be filled by the directors
unless the articles specifically reserve the vacancy-filling
power to the shareholders, as in a small or medium size corporation. In any event the shareholder-elected officer will be
found only in the small and (less likely) medium corporation,
and perhaps even then he will be exceptional.
Unlike the Model Act, South Carolina specifically requires
that officers be elected each year by the directors "unless
otherwise provided," e.g., by the by-laws.78 A five-year employment contract, in effect, would "otherwise provide." Here
the South Carolina law contemplates that such contract rights
do not restrict the power, as against the right, of the board
77. The South Carolina law closely follows MOD L ACT §38 on the
executive committee, except that S. C. §8.11(a) requires the executive or
any other committee to consist of a minimum of three directors. It also
specifically recognizes what is implied by the Model Act but should be
explicit, that "other committees" as well as an executive committee may
be established, e.g., a finance committee or committee on salaries and
bonuses, etc. S. C. §8.11 (a) also adds to the Model Act limits on executive

committee powers a bar to its "deelar[ing] dividends or other corporate
distributions," believing that this vital corporate power should be exercised
always and only by the board itself. But this does not prevent the directors from getting the benefit of committee thinking on dividends, any
more than committee incapacity to adopt a plan or merger or consolidation

would bar the board from receiving, indeed adopting, the executive or
finance committee's recommendations on a merger or consolidation. Finally,
a clarifying section makes all provisions of the act relating to. conduct of
meetings of directors equally applicable to any committee action.
78. S. C. §8.13 (c).
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of directors to remove an officer with or without cause as the
board may see fit-an application of the agency doctrine that
a contract cannot inhibit the principal's power, although it
may restrict his right, to remove so that he is liable in damages for breach of contract in removing his agent.79
C.

Duties of Directors and Officers

1. A Statutory Standard of Duty: The South Carolina
law goes beyond the Model Act by codifying the duty of directors on several vital points. First, section 8.15 commands
directors and officers to "exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith with a view to the interests
of the corporation and with that degree of diligence, care and
skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions." The South Carolina
revisers believed that a clear-cut statement of the duty of
directors and officers would serve many good purposes. It
would add clarity and precision to the statute, and thus give
assurance to those who must act; it would provide a legislatively approved guideline as against one to be deduced from
the often shifting language and always variable fact situations of the cases; and it would give the courts the authority
of a statutory standard in assessing conduct in specific situations. The terms used, largely adopted from the corresponding New York provision,8 0 but also reflective of the case law
in South Carolina, have a background of meaning in corporation law, although their application will inevitably depend, as with any breach of fiduciary duty, upon the facts
of a given case. That a statutory statement of duty cannot
automatically determine all possible cases is, of course, no
argument against a declaration of the standard.
2. Corporate Transactions with Directors and Officers:
Section 8.16 follows several other corporation law revisions
in authorizing transactions between corporations and their
directors and officers, thereby clarifying the duty of directors
. 79. S. C. §8.13(g) follows North Carolina (N. C. GEN. STAT. 55-34(c))
by authorizing the president, unless otherwise provided by the by-laws,

to "institute or defend legal proceedings whenever the dirctors or shareholders are deadlocked." This is helpful especially for the small corporation, and indeed, any corporation with two or some other even number of
shareholders or directors. If directors or shareholders fear the president's
power, it is a simple matter to remove it by negating it in the articles
or by-laws.
80. N. Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §717.
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and officers in a specific type of situation which frequently
presents itself, especially in smaller corporations. Confused
American case law on this point presents three distinct rules:
that the contract between the corporation and an interested
director or officer is voidable at the option of the corporation
(1) regardless of non-participation by the director in the
approval of the contract; (2) if it is unfair or if the interested director's vote was needed to approve the contract; and
(3) only if the contract is unfair, whether or not the interested director's vote was needed to approve the contract. California's section 8201 was the statutory pioneer in foreshadowing subsequent adoption elsewhere, notably North Carolina,8 2 and New York.8 3 South Carolina declares that "no
transaction in which a director or officer has a personal or
adverse interest," as defined, is "void or voidable solely for
this reason or solely because he is present at or participates in
the meeting or his vote is counted."5 4 Emphasis is upon the
adverb "solely," since the transaction may be attacked on
grounds other than the director's presence or participation.
Moreover, whatever the situation, there is no reason why a
director's interest should have any bearing upon the existence or non-existence of a quorum at the meeting which considers the transaction, as distinguished from the vote by
which the transaction is approved; and the new statute avoids
some of the case law confusion by detaching the question of
a director's interest from the determination of a quorum.8 5
Section 8.16 then states three grounds 88 upon which contracts of interested directors or officers may be validated;
(1) if a disinterested majority of the board of directors approves the contract with full knowledge of the facts, which
must be recorded in the minutes; (2) if the shareholders
ratify the interested director's contract with full knowledge
of the facts, except that the interested director's shares may
not vote; and (3) if the transaction is fair and equitable as
of the time it is authorized or approved, with the party asserting fairness having to prove fairness. Thus, the third provision adopts as a catch-all the so-called liberal American
81. CAL. CORP. COD §820.
82. N. C. GEn. STAT. §55-30.

83. N. Y. Bus. Conp. LAw §713.
84. S. C. §8.16(a).
85. S. C. §8.16(c). A similar rule applies to computing a quorum at a
meeting of shareholders who approve the contract.
86. S. C. §8.16 (a) (1)43).
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rule in upholding a contract irrespective of "conflict of interest" if the transaction is shown by the interested party
87
to be fair and equitable.
Moreover, this section embraces not only interested director, but also inter-corporate, transactions,8 8 e.g., between parent, subsidiary and affiliated corporations; and transactions
between corporations, partnerships or associations in which
9
a director has a "financial interest direct or indirect."
3. Loans to Insiders: Section 8.17 of the new South Carolina law on loans to directors, officers, and shareholders differs substantially from the Model Act, which empowers a
corporation "to lend money to its employees other than its
officers and directors and otherwise [to] assist its employees,
officers, and directors." 9 0 This rather laconic provision seemed unclear, and if clear then undesirable, because of the potential inroads of the "otherwise assist" clause upon the prohibition of loans, for it would seem to open many ways by
which a corporation could, consistent with the Model Act,
"otherwise assist" by guaranties, assumption of debts, and
even outright gratuities, seemingly subject only to the vague
limits in terms of wasting corporate assets. Accordingly, the
South Carolina statute first forbids a corporation "directly or
indirectly [to] make any loan of money or property to, or guarantee the obligation of" directors, officers, or their nominees,
either of the corporation or an affiliate, parent or subsidiary
corporation; similarly prescribed are loans upon security of
the shares of the corporation or of an affiliate, parent or
subsidiary. 91 The exception, however, is that any loan or
guaranty may be made if approved either by all shares of the
corporation, or by at least two-thirds of the shares not interested in or benefited by the loan or guaranty.92 The risk
to the corporation of a disinterested two-thirds majority lending money or guaranteeing obligations seems minimal. The
alternative of unanimous approval recognizes the freedom of
87. In §8.16, the phrase "fair and equitable" is used instead of the

California phrase, "just and reasonable" since the former is familiar from
long use, especially in federal bankruptcy and reorganization statutes,

and has sufficient case law to give some content to it.
88. S. C. §8.16 (b).

89. Section 8.16 follows MODEL ACT §33, last sentence, in authorizing

the directors (or under S. C. §8.16, the executive committee) to fix director compensation, except so far as the articles or by-laws otherwise
provide.
90. MODEL ACT §4 (f).

91. S. C. n8.17(a).

92. S. C. §8.17(b).
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corporations to do what they wish (subject to creditor protection) if all shareholders approve. In all events, loans or
guaranties require adequate security and the prevailing rate
of interest. This provision seems particularly important, not
to inhibit the reputable corporation, but to conutrol abuse by
the very small or medium size corporation where unscrupulous insiders may use corporate powers to advance their own
interest to the detriment of both the corporation and of the
shareholders.
4. Indemnification: The question of indemnification of
directors and officers is a delicate one upon which state laws
greatly vary. Ths is an extensive topic in and of itself, and
a survey article of this sort could not appropriately analyze
the arguments for and against broad and restrictive indemnification provisions. Model Act section 4(o)treats indemnification as a corporate power which is broadly defined. South
Carolina, however, follows California in dealing with indemnification as a matter of the right of the person to be indemnified.0 3 Apart from the content of the new South Carolina
provision or the merits of its resolution of the arguments
against and for indemnity rights, it is believed that a specification in terms of right of director or officer to be indemnified is superior to a provision empowering the corporation
to indemnify. Briefly, any present or former director, officer
or employee as well as certain others have a right to reimbursement of expenses incurred either in a civil or criminal
action, if (1) he has been successful on the merits and has
not been found guilty of "negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty to the corporation," or (2) the court
awarding indemnification finds that he "fairly and equitably
merits indemnification." A similar "fair and equitable"
standard permits the person to be indemnified for a judgment paid by him or a settlement approved by the court. In
short, indemnification is controlled by the court, not by the
directors, and these rights are exclusive under the South
Carolina law. The basic objective here is to avoid misuse of
corporate funds by indemnifying guilty directors and officers,
and especially to avoid indemnification of a director or officer for the funds paid in settlement of a derivative suit. Invoking court processes to control indemnification does not
93. S. C.§8.18.
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imply mistrust of corporate management, but it is the best
way to remove incentives to misconduct in this area.
5. Why a Statutory Statement of Director Duties: These
last provisions dealing with the duties of directors and officers represent a judgment of the South Carolina revisers that
a statute should declare, at least in some areas of dispute and
uncertainty, high standards of conduct, and give some effective enforcement to them, rather than assume (somewhat
unrealistically) that they will be always respected. Unquestionably, the trend of corporate law has been towards high
standards more explicitly stated and more readily remedied
when breached. The enforcement of higher standards is conducive to confidence in corporate enterprise, and this in turn
adds an inductment to investors to move funds into productive enterprise. One can hardly fail to note that vast increases in investment, and the opening of previously unavailable sources of money, have paralleled the development of
effective securities laws beginning with the federal statutes
of 1933 and 1934. Moreover, the best of business adheres to
at least as high standards as those which even strict statutes
set forth, for sound business recognizes the futility of organizing commerce (including raising money) without mutual
trust. From this standpoint, then, articulation of and remedies for breach of high standards should not impair the interests of corporate enterprise but rather should be to its
advantage, if only for its long run encouragement of investment. Apart from this affirmative justification, there is also
the negative angle, that many, probably a minority, of enterprises refuse to adhere to proper standards to the detriment
of many interests, including business as a whole. Especially
is it necessary to protect shareholders of very small and medium size enterprises whose management is often far more
contemptuous of shareholder interests than in the case of
larger corporations. Because a state statute must regulate
all corporations and protect all shareholders, some restrictive
provisions are appropriate. But this does not assume that
corporate organizers and management are rogues; Holmes'
"bad man" theory of law properly has little application to
corporation law. Rather, definition, clarification, and sound
standards are the prime justifications.
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VII.

SHAREHOLDERS

The chapter on shareholders is an unusually important
pait of any corporation law. First of all, it deals with that
sensitive point of intersection between the sometimes opposed
interests of management and of shareholders, and, indeed,
probably the greatest number of corporate law cases come
up in the context of a dispute as to management prerogatives
and shareholder rights. Secondly, for this very reason, it is
appropriate for a new corporation law, by precise and comprehensive regulation, to resolve in advance as many as possible of the problems which are both readily identifiable
and also susceptible to statutory resolution; and it is in this
area that a new corporation statute may well codify much
case law. Thirdly, if this is so, it should be especially helpful
in a jurisdiction which has had relatively little corporate law
litigation and for which statutory rules can foreclose many
questions which might otherwise require litigation not only
to apply the rule (something no statute can avoid) but also
to establish the rule in the first instance (something which
codification can avoid).
The South Carolina chapter on shareholders omits almost
no Model Act material, but extensively supplements it. Some
of the more interesting provisions are discussed below.
A. The By-Laws. The statutory provision applicable to
corporate by-laws is a crucial point in the power allocation
between shareholders and directors. Depending upon the content of that section, virtually untrammeled power may be
shifted to management, or the shareholders may retain some
control over the directors. The most conspicuous application
of the latter objective appears in the North Carolina law.9 4
In contrast, the key Model Act provision, section 25, vests
exclusive "power to alter, amend, or repeal the by-laws or
adopt new by-laws . .. in the board of directors unless reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorporation."
It would be naive not to recognize that this grants near total
control to the directors since in practice it will be exceptional
for incorporators to reserve any or all power over the bylaws to the shareholders, and then only is this likely to occur
in the truly closely held enterprise.
94. N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-16 (1960).
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The South Carolina revisionP5 does not permit such abdication of by-law power to directors, recognizing, as the Supreme Court said in Rosers v. Hill,9" that the "power to prescribe rules for the government of business corporations reasonably is deemed an incident of ownership and the voting
p.owers of the shares." Assuming that concepts of "corporate
democracy" have been overdone by forcing an inapt political
analogy upon the quite different corporate situation, nonetheless it is true that some shareholder control is the best means
currently available to restrain management and also the best
-way to permit the investors, where interested, to have some
voice in important decisions bearing upon their investment.
R-ejecting, then, the view opposed to "corporate democracy"
-that management is entitled to total power over the corporation (subject only to scant statutory and articles of incorporation limits)-this argument recognizes some permanent role for shareholders in shaping the by-laws; and therefore the problem is to balance the director interest in prompt
adjustment of the by-laws to current needs with the shareholder interest in preserving its role in the corporation.
The touchstone of the South Carolina provision is the guarantee that the by-laws are "subject always to the right of the
shareholders to adopt, amend, or repeal" them.9 7 Elsewhere
it is stated that "such continuing power of the shareholders
with respect to by-laws shall not be denied, inhibited or impaired by the articles of incorporation or by the by-laws or
otherwise," other than as permitted by the act, and especially
by the by-law section. 98 Starting from this basic proposition,
the statute gives joint power over the by-laws to the directors
and to the shareholders. Indeed, the directors may always
"'adopt, amend, or repeal by-laws," and they may do so with
respect to a by-law previously adopted by the shareholders
.'unless such by-laws shall forbid amendment or repeal or
limit the extent to which it may be amended or repealed."9 9
This contrasts with the North Carolna provision which forbids the directors to alter, amend or repeal the by-laws absent specific authority from the shareholders to do so.100 The
South Carolina law recognizing merit here, reversed the rule,
95". S. C. §6.1.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

289 U. S. 582, 588 (1933).
S. C. §6.1(c).
S. C. 46.1(d).
S. C. §6.1(c).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-16(a) (1) (1960).
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in the interests of flexibility, and placed the burden upon the
shareholders, if they wish to preclude amendment of their
by-law by the directors, specifically to curb the directors'
power in this regard, otherwise it may be changed by the
directors under their by-law power. Were this not so, a shareholder adopted by-law which should now be changed because.
of changed conditions could never be amended except by calling a meeting of the shareholders for that purpose.
Moreover, the directors cannot use their power over the,
by-laws to effect a de facto destruction of shareholder powerover the by-laws by requiring a quorum or vote greater than
specified in the act, on the articles or a by-law adopted by
the shareholders. 10 1 Otherwise, the directors could easily
adopt a by-law which would require unanimous or greaterthan-majority shareholder action to amend the by-laws, thus,
permanently hamstringing shareholder action on the by-laws,
The by-laws section of the new South Carolina law contemplates that directors and shareholders will normally work in
harmony. The guarantees designed to prevent shareholders.
and directors from encroaching upon each other's by-law
power would likely show their teeth only if there is a sharpcontest between management and shareholders, and that is
precisely the time when management would be10 2most tempted
to abuse an exclusive power over the by-laws.
The new South Carolina law is, it is believed, the first
jurisdiction to adopt the essence of the Model Act proposal'
for emergency by-laws in the event of nuclear attack or nuclear or atomic accident or disaster. 0 3 Like the Model Act,
South Carolina specifies the points which may be included
in the emergency by-laws, but it also broadly declares that
"if emergency by-laws have not been adopted by a corporation, action by shareholders, directors, officers, agents, or
employees during any emergency," as defined by the section,
101. S. C. §6.1(c).
102. One or two minor provisions are also worth noting. One requires
that any action on the by-laws which is proposed to be taken at a meeting
of the shareholders or directors must be included in the notice of meeting.
S. C. §6.1(f). This notice is, of course, subject to the statutory provisions regarding waiver of notice and defective notice. As in MODEL AcT"
§48 (i) any provision which may properly appear in the by-laws may be
inserted in the articles of incorporation (S. C. §6.1(a)). This serves
the small corporation where the bargain worked out between the shareholders may best be placed in the articles of incorporation which can be
amended only by complying with statutory formalities; in all events the
option exists for those who wish to use it.
103. Compare S. C. §6.2 with MoDr, Acr §25A.
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"shall be valid if it substantially is in compliance with this
section or if it is otherwise necessary and practical for the
emergency operation and management of the business."' 10 4
This latter provision protects directors and others who act
for the good of the corporation during an emergency but
whose corporation did not have the foresight or opportunity
to enact emergency by-laws. At most, any statutory provision
(or by-law for that matter) can afford only the roughest
guide in such a tragic milieu; and, without wading into details, it would seem sufficient to authorize, as the South Carolina law does, such action as is "necessary and practical" to
operate and manage the corporation. This is also the general
standard for those provisions which could be inserted in
emergency by-laws under the main provisions of the act.
Because of the sweeping powers which emergency by-laws
may confer upon directors, officers, and agents, the South
Carolina revision carefully restricts the occasions for the effectiveness of such by-laws. They are to become "automatically operative upon and remain in force only during" the
emergency, but upon its termination they "shall cease to be
operative."' 1 5 Moreover, the South Carolina law defines the
emergency as arising from "any nuclear or atomic attack
upon the United States" or "any nuclear or atomic accident
or disaster occurring in or substantially affecting" South
Carolina, 10 6 thereby distinguishing the calamitous nationwide
impact of a "nuclear or atomic attack" from the possibly quite
localized effect of an atomic or nuclear "accident or disaster."
In short, there is no reason why emergency by-laws in South
Carolina should take effect because of an accident in New
Mexico or Idaho, but there is every reason for emergency
provisions if a nuclear disaster should occur at installations
at Aiken, South Carolina, or if an atomic weapon carried in
a SAC mission were accidentally detonated across the border
in North Carolina with substantial adverse effects in South
Carolina. Beyond this, like the Model Act, the new law does
not attempt further to define "emergency," since this would
raise, at least, questions as to whether the "emergency" is
one declared by competent governmental authority, or simply
post-nuclear chaos existing in fact.
104. S.C. §6.2(c).
105. S. C. §6.2(b).
106. S. C. §6.2(a).
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B.

Meetings of Shareholders

1. Call, Notice and Record Date of Meetings of Shareholders: South Carolina adopts the flexible Model Act provisions
which are designed to facilitate shareholder meetings and
eliminate useless formalities. Like Model Act section 22, but
unlike earlier South Carolina law, 107 shareholder meetings
may be held either within or outside the state. 0 8 By adopting other Model Act provisions regarding notice of the meeting, the record date, waiver of notice, etc., the procedures and
techniques for convening a shareholders meeting under the
South Carolina law become virtually identical with those
Model Act provisions which have been so extensively adopted
in other states. As in Model Act section 26, a failure to hold
the annual meeting not only does not "work a forfeiture or
dissolution of the corporation," but also it "shall not affect
otherwise valid corporate acts."' 0 9 The objective here is to
prevent the voiding of action taken by the corporation on
the grounds solely that the annual meeting was not called at
the proper time or a sufficient number of directors had not
been elected to conduct the business of the corporation. Stated
affirmatively some other ground must also be shown for
voiding the action taken by the corporation. This accords
wth modern corporate law objectives of minimizing the substantive effect of technical and formal deficiencies even
though such formalities may be desirable and important from
the standpoint of orderly conduct of business.
As to the record date for determining shareholders, the
South Carolina law seeks to discourage that the old practice
of closing the stock books is not at all the preferred practice,
by first specifying the record date procedure and then permitting the closed stock transfer books only as an alternative." 0 Indeed, it may well be that, following the logical New
York rule,"' South Carolina will some day altogether abolish the clumsy procedure of closing the books.
2. Power of Court to Order Meeting Improperly Postponed: Section 6.4 of the new South Carolina law, based on
107. S. C. CODE §12-251 (1952).
108. S. C. §6.3 (a).
109. S. C. §6.3(b): "A failure to hold the annual meeting at the desig-

nated time or to elect a sufficient number of directors to conduct the bu.iness7 of the corporation" does not invalidate acts or cause forfeiture. The
italicized phrase does not appear in MODEL ACT §26.
110. S. C. §6.6(a),(d).
111. N. Y. Bus. CoaRP. LAW §604.
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a Delaware statute 12 but not duplicated in the Model Act,
deals expressly with the occasional though annoying problems arising from a failure to hold the annual meeting and
to elect directors. If no meeting has been held for thirty days
after the date specified by the by-laws or, absent such specification, for thirteen months after the previous annual meeting, any shareholder may apply to the appropriate court to
order a substitute annual meeting to be held, and the court
has full power to take the necessary steps to implement its
order of a meeting. Such court action is hardly novel. Not
only is there probably an inherent jurisdiction in equity
courts to deal with the problem of the improperly postponed
shareholder meeting, but also an increasing number of states
have followed the Delaware lead and have made specific stat.
utory provision in this area."i3 In addition, there is a small
though useful body of precedent, built up especially by the
Delaware chancery, dealing with the conduct of meetings ordered by the court or otherwise under its supervision. Apart
from this, there are good reasons for specifically recognizing
and regulating court jurisdiction to deal with wrongfully
postponed shareholder meetings. The South Carolina section,
at least, is predicated upon the conviction, expressed by the
Massachusetts court, that "[t]he stockholders constitute the
governing power of the corporation. Provision that there shall
be a meeting every year for the election of officers [and presumably directors] confers upon the stockholders a valuable
right of which they cannot be deprived by corporate officers." 114 Also, given the permissible high quorum requirements which increase the chances that shareholders meetings
may be blocked, it is desirable to confer court jurisdiction.
Finally, it is to be remembered that the power of the court
in this area is discretionary, although a shareholder's standing is a matter of right.
3. Special and Adjourned Meetings of Shareholders: Like
Model Act section 26, the new South Carolina law recognizes
that special shareholder meetings may be called, and speci112. DEL.CoRP. LAW §224.
113. See N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §60S, and other jurisdictions cited at
2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. 437 (1960).

114. Albert E. Touchet, Inc., v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 509, 163 N. E.
184, 188 (1928) ; see also Camden & Atl. R. P_ v. Elkins, 37 N. J.Eq. (10
Stew.) 273, 276 (Ct. Err. & App. 1883).
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fies those who may make the call. 115 Other provisions meet
certain problems raised by special shareholder meetings.
Thus, the statute specifically commands the appropriate officer to give notice of a special meeting called by a person
entitled to do so, specifies the time within which it must be
done, and prescribes the alternative procedure if the officer
fails to give notice.'1 6 Similarly, a record date for such a special meeting is specially provided giving the person calling
the meeting a right to fix the record date in accordance with
the general provisions of the section."1
Unlike the Model Act, South Carolina deals specifically with
the adjourned meeting,"1 8 essentially codifying decisions
reached in Delaware. Distinguishing between meetings adjourned for more or less than thirty days, the statute provides
that if it is for less than thirty days, fresh notice is unnecessary if notice was given when the adjournment was taken,
but if for more than thirty days, the general notice requirements must be met. Similarly, notice must be given if at any
adjourned meeting the corporation proposes to take up business which could not properly have been considered at the
original meeting, thus precluding the possible abuse of noticing a meeting for certain purposes, adjourning it, and then
taking up at the adjourned meeting, perhaps with a smaller
quorum, business which the stockholders did not know would
be considered even at the original meeting. The requirement
that fresh notice be given is modified somewhat since the old
record date may be used unless the directors wish to set a new
record date.
4. Conduct of Shareholder Meetings: Several provisions
not duplicated in the Model Act are helpful in the conduct
of shareholder meetings. First, the requirement of a list of
shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting follows Model
Act section 29 in its major outline. However, the South Carolina law provides that the list requirement is satisfied, thus
obviating preparation of a special list, if shareholder records
115. S. C. §6.3(d). As a matter of detail, in contrast to MODEL ACT
§26 authorizing special meetings of shareholders to be called, inter alia, by
the "board of directors," S. C. §6.3(d) permits the call by the chairman
of the board or by "a majority of the board of directors."
116. S. C. §6.4 (b).
117. S. C. §6.6(c).
118. S. C. §6.4(c).
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already show the essential information." 9 This essential information is, of course, the name and address of each shareholder, alphabetically arranged or indexed by his name, to-gether with his holdings, both as to number and, where
applicable, as to class and series. If the stock books are already so arranged, there is no reason to require the preparaton of a special list.
Secondly, Model Act section 29 requires that the shareholder list be made available "for a period of ten days prior
to such meeting." But since notice of the meeting may be
,given as long as fifty days before the date of the meeting,
and since mailing out the notice will involve at least some
of the labor of preparing a voting list, it would not seem
-burdensome for the voting list to be available for longer than
-ten days. The South Carolina statute meets this by providing
that "[flor a period commencing upon the date when notice
of the meeting is given, and in no event less than ten days
prior to the date of the meeting" the voting list must be kept
on file either at the corporation's registered office or at its
principal place of business or at the office of its transfer
agent or registrar. These latter alternatives give a broader
option to the corporation, and in this respect follow the more
1 20
flexible provision of the Virginia code.
Thirdly, with respect to the sanction for non-preparation
or non-filing of the voting list, South Carolina takes a different approach from the Model Act, which awards to the shareholder damages against defaulting officer or other agent. In
contrast, the South Carolina law 12 1 adopts a much better proportioned sanction by providing that if the requirements of
the section have not been substantially complied with, the
meeting shall be adjourned until there is compliance. This
should be the strongest incentive of all to corporations to
comply with the voting list requirements, in order to avoid
delay and indeed possible court action in extreme instances. 122
119. §6.7(a): "The requirement of a list shall be satisfied, and no list
need be prepared, if the record of shareholders readily shows, in alpha'betical order or by alphabetical index, and by classes or series if any,
the information required to appear in a list of shareholders." The preceding. sentence of §6.7(a) specifies the "information" in language identical with MODEL ACT §26, first sentence.
120. VA. CODE §13.1-30 (1956).

121. S. C. §6.7(e).
122. Like many recent corporations laws, although unlike the Model Act
16.17 of the South Carolina law provides for voting inspectors to insure an orderly and fair conduct of the voting-something which is

'highly desirable for all corporations, and for the shareholders, especially
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5. Regulatng the Cumulative Voting Right: South Carolina has, at least for the present, 2 3 retained mandatory cumulative voting as required by the South Carolina constitution.124 But in order to meet some problems which can arise
under cumulative voting, whether mandatory or permissive,
tvo provisions, appearing recently in several new corporation
laws, should prove most useful, and of general interest, whatever one's views on the merits of this controversial topic.
Under section 6.20 of the new law, a cumulative voting
right, whether granted by constitution, statute or by the articles of incorporation, may be exercised only if one of two
conditions are met. The shareholder who proposes to vote
cumulatively either must give written notice to the corporation at least two days before the date of the meeting, or if he
fails do do so he must announce his intention to vote cumulatively at the meeting, and he must make his announcement
before the voting for directors begins. At this point, the presiding officer may, or must if a shareholder requests, recess
the meeting. The recess permits all of the shareholders to
work out the sometimes complicated mathematics of most
efficiently using their cumulative voting right. In the past,
shareholders have occasionally miscalculated their voting
power under cumulative voting provisions, and a minority has
been able to elect a majority or all of the directors of a corporation. 12 5 This can occur since, even when cumulative
voting is declared "mandatory," shareholders may still, either
from ignorance or other reasons, vote straight; but if some
vote straight and others vote cumulatively, there may be a
surprise for the straight voters.' 2 6 Whatever the merits of
cumulative voting, certainly no one should gain an advantage
merely through surprise and the lack of opportunity for opponents to calculate the best use of their votes on a cumulative
basis. Indeed such reasonable regulation of cumulative voting
if an election is or is likely to be contested. The inducement to use voting
inspectors, and one which especially benefits the corporation itself, is the
provision that a report or certificate of the inspectors is prima facia
evidence of the facts stated in the report, and also of the vote as the inspectors may state it.
123. S. C. §6.20.
124. S. C. CONST. art. IX, §1L
125. Locallv, there is a hint in an old case, State ex rel. Springer v.
Ellison, 106 S. C. 139, 90 S. E. 699 (1916), that such may have been the
situation there, although the facts are too brief to be certain as to iust
what happened.
126. See the case cited in 1 MODEL Bus. ConP. AcT ANN. 532 at 3.15.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/2

42

1963]

The Model
Act and
theSSouth
Corporation
THE Folk:
MODEL
ACT AND
THE
C. Carolina
CORP. LAW
317Law

can be endorsed independently
of provisions making it manda7

tory or permissive.

12

6. Provisions on Voting by Shareholders: The South
Carolina law, besides stating the general rule that each share
is entitled to one vote per share except as limited "either
absolutely or conditionally" by the statute or the articles of
incorporation, 128 also authorizes the articles to confer voting
rights on creditors. 1 29 Such rights may be granted "either
absolutely or conditionally" and they may not be terminated
except on written assent of two-thirds of the aggregate face
30
amount of the creditor securities.
As to voting by corporations, shareholders, etc., the South
Carolina law generally follows Model Act section 31, but in
some respects it is stricter and also adds certain other provisions.
For example, the Model Act forbids voting or counting towards a quorum any treasury shares or "shares held by another corporation if a majority of the shares entitled to vote
for the election of directors of such other corporation is held
by the corporation.'- 31 Everyone agrees, presumably, that
the voting power of shares owned by a corporation in itself
should be sterilized, in order to prevent the most obvious
sort of self-perpetuation by directors. The question is whether
to do so by a flat rule-such as that of the Model Act and also
the 1961 New York revision' 32-which immediately poses the
question as to whether a parent corporation's shares owned
by its 49% subsidiary, which it "controls" in all practical
purposes, shall be voted in electing directors of the parent.
South Carolina follows Ohio, 3 Connecticut, 1 4 and Delaware, 35 in providing that "no corporation shall directly or
indirectly vote any shares issued by it. ' ' 136 Although, admittedly, this leaves the matter more at large than under the
127. This has also been adopted in North Carolina, N. C. GEN. STAT.

§55.67(c), and Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §33-325, although surprisingly, not in the 1961 New York revision.
128. S. C. §6.11(a),(b).
129. S. C. §6.11(d), following DEL. CORP. LAw §221, VA. CODE §13.1-32
(1956), N. Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §518 (b), and others.
130. See, also, S. C. §6.14(i) making the proxy rules of §6.14 applicable
to proxies given by creditors.
131. MODEL ACT .31, par. 2.
132. N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §6.12 (b).
133. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §1701.47(e).
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. §324(c) (Supp. 1959).
135. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAw §160.
136. S. C. §6.12 (a).
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Model Act, it avoids the implication of the Model Act provision that only treasury shares and shares held by a 50% subsidiary are disfranchised. But its prime objective is to prevent maneuvers to evade the prohibiton against a corporation
voting its own shares, and the fact that it has survived in
several important commercial jurisdictions suggests that the
absence of a flat rule is no great problem.
On voting by fiduciaries, South Carolina law approaches
the problem somewhat differently from the Model Act. There
the shares must be transferred into a trustee's name before
he can vote;137 the South Carolina law permits a trustee,
indeed any fiduciary other than certain court appointed fiduciaries, to vote shares without transfer if he furnishes "proof
satisfactory to the corporation of his authority to vote. 1 88
This technique would seem to have the merits of simplicity
as against the requirement that the shares be transferred into
the trustee's name. Of course, there is nothing to bar transfer into a fiduciary's name, and the South Carolina law spe,cifically provides "that any fiduciary may vote shares which
s
As in the Model Act,14 0
stand of record in his name."'
shares held by executors, administrators, guardians, or other
court appointed fiduciaries may vote without transfer of
shares into their names although the new South Carolina
law' 4 ' requires 42that they prove their appointment as a condition to voting.
A useful provision of the South Carolina law also deals
with the case of shares jointly owned by, among others, fiduciaries, joint tenants, and tenants in common. Here the act
of a majority binds all, except in an even division in which
case the vote on the shares is equally divided between the
factions. 148
137. MODEL ACT §31, par. 6.
138. S. C. §6.12(d).
139. S. C. §6.12(c).
140. MODEL ACT §31, par. 6.
141. S.C. §6.12(d).
142. Other provisions permit a minor to vote shares standing of record
in his own name and forbid him to disaffirm the vote (S. C. §6.12(e)),
and authorize any partner to vote shares standing in the name of a partnership, and any general partner to vote shares standing in the name of
a limited partnership (S. C. §6.12(i)). S. C. §6.12(b) essentially follows
MODEL ACT §31, par. 5 as to shares standing in the name of other corporations, except to specify the corporate personnel to whom the corporation whose shares are being voted may safely look for authority to vote,
absent some contrary specification in the by-laws of the corporation in
whose name shares stand of record.
148. S. C. §6.15. See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §1701.46(E) and N. C.
GEN. STAT. §55-69 (f).
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7. Proxies: A distinctive provision of the new South
Carolina law attempts to regulate, in perhaps greater detail
than any other state corporation law, the proxy system. It
thus recognizes that shareholder action is today usually a
matter of giving a proxy to vote the shares rather than voting
or otherwise personally participating. Because this is true
not only of the large but also of many small and medium
size corporations, it seems important to protect this essential
link between the shareholder and his corporation and to eliminate various abuses. For this, there is ample precedent both
in statutes and rules administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, especially section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and its regulation 14, and in some few
state laws. The overall object is to afford a degree of protection to the interest of the shareholders and at the same time
lay down some ground rules for management in soliciting and
using proxies.
The touchstone of the section adopts the SEC language forbidding solicitation of proxies on the basis of "false and misleading" statements or omissions with respect to any "material fact."'41 4 It is believed that this prohibition can be effective without administrative machinery, since if the section is
violated, shareholders can go to court, show the abuse or
violation, and secure from the court, acting as an equity
tribunal, any needed orders to prevent further violations or
undo the effect of prior violations. Since many large corporations are often subject to the SEC proxy rules, and since
most of them follow ethical practices, there is little restraint
upon management prerogatives and the beneficial prohibition
against fraudulent solicitation is extended to smaller corporations. Indeed, these are usually the worst offenders, and their
shareholders most need such protection.
Other provisions of the proxy section clearly specify the
1 of a proxy, in the process codifying
character and duration 45
much relevant agency law, since a proxy is a type of agency.
Thus the appointment of a proxy to vote a shareholder's stock
"shall be (by) printed or written proxy executed by the share14-. S. C. §6.14(e).

145. Like MODEL ACT §31, par. 3, under S. C. §6.14(c), a proxy be-

comes invalid after eleven months. To prevent evasion, S. C. §6.14(c)

provides that "[elvery proxy shall be dated as if its execution and no

proxy shall be undated or postdated." See Securities Exchange Act Rule
14a-1o.
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holder. ., or by a telegram or cablegram appearing to have
been transmitted by a shareholder."'140 It is expressly provided, with an important exception, 147 that all proxies are
revocable, and are in fact revoked by later proxies as well as
an instrument of revocation. But a proxy holder's authority
is not revoked by death or by the shareholder's supervening
incapacity unless written notice is received by the corporation. Moreover, a shareholder's appearance at the meeting
does not of itself revoke the proxy; to do so, he must 4notify
8
the appropriate officer or give notice at the meeting.
C.

Election of Directors

The South Carolina law follows the Delaware statute for
judicial review of the election of directors and appointment
of officers.' 4 0 In this grant of jurisdiction, procedure is specified and the court empowered to make all necessary orders,
relative to notice to all interested parties, issuing subpoenas
and interlocutory orders to restrain action while the case
pends.
The key provision is the relief which the court may grant.
With respect to an election of directors or an appointment
of officers it can (1) confirm the result, (2) set it aside
and, if the facts warrant, declare other candidates elected or
appointed, or (3) vacate the election and remand for a new
election, with or without a special master to supervise it.
This adopts the broad Delaware powers as against the narnow New York relief which was limited to confirming the
election or ordering a new one. In addition, the court has
explicit jurisdiction under this section to determine the shareholders entitled to vote, although there would probably be
an implied power to do so.'"0
The remedial provisions of this section may be invoked by
the defeated candidate for a directorship, a shareholder of
record, or indeed by a shareholder seeking what is essentially
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of an election. The
Delaware experience shows some use of this sort of provision,
146. S. C. §6.14(b).
147. The exception is for irrevocable proxies, S. C. §6.14(f) based on
N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §609, discussed in detail below.
148. S. C. §6.14(c).
149. S. C. §6.19, following especially DEL. GEN. CORi'. LAW §§224-227.
See also CAL. CORP. CODE §§2236-2238, N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §619, N. C.
GEN. STAT. §55-71, and VA. CODE §13.1-42.

150. S. C. §6.19(d) (3).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss2/2

46

1963]

THE MODEL ACT AND THE S. C. CoRP. LAw

321

Folk: The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law

although the number of cases seems moderate, and unlike
derivative suits this statutory power given to the courts
seems to have generated no particular outcry against "strike"
or other abusive litigation. On balance, then, it seems decidedly beneficial, even if there is occasional abuse or delaying
maneuver, to provide a clear cut statutory procedure in lieu
of the cumbersome common law quo warranto writ, and the
uncertain and inadequately defined equity jurisdiction which,
if it exists at all, affords only narrow relief.
D.

Shareholder Control Devices and Procedures

This topic covers the comprehensive South Carolina provisions on (1) voting agreements among shareholders, (2)
voting trusts, (3) irrevocable proxies, and (4) agreements
by shareholders respecting control of directors, in that order.
1. Shareholder Voting Agreements: Section 6.15 cf the
new law, which is not paralleled in the Model Act although
found in a few other states, 151 specifically validates agreements by two or more shareholders as to voting their shares
"if in writing and signed by the parties thereto." The section
then directs that the "shares shall be voted as provided by
the agreement, or as the parties may agree, or as determined
in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by the parties."
Examples would include-typically in the case of a deadlock
among the parties to the agreement-an arbitration clause
or an irrevocable proxy to vote the shares, to be invoked or
become automatically operative under certain defined circumstances. However, there is no effort to specify the content of a shareholder voting agreement; the section only
broadly validates it. There are several sound reasons for
doing so. Apart from a need to dispel doubts created by
52
statutory recogniJohnson v. Spartanburg Co. Fair Ass'n,1
tion of the voting agreement is a reassuring guarantee of its
validity as well as notice of its legal status to out-of-state
shareholders. Secondly, since many of the purposes of vote
pooling agreements, as here, may be achieved through the
more elaborate and formal device of a voting trust, it is
appropriate to foreclose any inference that the statutory
voting trust is the exclusive method for consolidating shareholder voting power. Thirdly, this section is intended to place
151. See N. Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw §620(a) and N. C. GEN. STAT. 555-73 (a).
152. 210 S. C. 56, 72-73, 41 S. E. 2d 599 (1947).
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the voting trust and pooling agreement on a parity and therefore, both are limited to a ten year period, after which both
may be renewed or extended. Finally, such agreements have
real utility in all sorts of corporations. They are, of course,
typically associated with the small or middle size enterprise,
but they may also be useful on occasions in public-issue corporations for control purposes, e.g., massing voting power
to stabilize the corporation during a period of dissension
among shareholders, meeting a proxy challenge, presenting a
strong front against a competitor's acquisition of shares, or
steadying the corporation at an early stage in its life or after
reorganization or some other bout with creditors. 158
2. Voting Trust: The South Carolina law, like the Model
Act, places voting trusts on a statutory basis and limits their
duration to a ten year period. 1 54 It is intended that the statutory voting trust shall be exclusive. This is particularly important since in South Carolina, at least, common law has
sustained voting trusts of a duration which seems excessive
measured in terms of the well being of the corporation. 55
Hence, the Model Act ten year period was chosen. This overcomes the difficulty of breaking a trust of undue duration,
and should prevent the concomitant long term freezing of
management and incentive, perhaps accented by unduly conservative shareholders who refuse to allow the enterprise to
embark on new adventures and seize new business opportunities. The voting trust, although limited to ten years, of
course, is subject to the rights to renewal or extension of
the voting trust.'5 6 But, renewal or extension does involve
a new trust. The consent of all parties who wish to continue the trust is needed, since those who do not wish to do
so "shall be entitled to remove their shares from the trust
and promptly to have their share certificates reissued to
them."'1 57 Hence, renewal or extension may well involve
changed terms and conditions to meet changed circumstances.
Because of some decisions in other states which have invalidated a voting trust altogether if its duration does or
may exceed the statutory period, the South Carolina law
153. The same objectives can, of course, be achieved through the more
formal device of the voting trust.
154. Compare S. C. §6.16 with MODEL ACT §32.
155. Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S. C. 9; 181 S.E. 897 (1935). This
result is not atypical in the United States.
156. S. C. §6.16 (e).
157. Ibid.
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specifically provides that While the extended time period is
unlawful, the trust is perfectly valid for ten years after its
creation, but becomes invalid only after the expiration of
the ten year period. 158 Several minor provisions clarify the
voting trust rights. Thus, the agreement must remain on
file for inspection both at the corporation's registered office
(as in the Model Act) and with the voting trustees.0 9 It is
specifically required that both copies of the agreement at the
registered office and the voting trustees must be kept up to
date. 160 Again the voting trustees must maintain a complete and current list of voting trust certificate holders,16 1
somewhat after the fashion of requiring the corporation to
keep a complete and current record of the shareholders. 62
3. Irrevocable Proxies: Irrevocable proxies can play a
helpful role in the corporation, and as already suggested in
discussing shareholder voting agreements, they may be used
to break a deadlock on voting the shares. South Carolina 0 8
follows the New York law (which antedates but is continued
by the 1961 New York Business Corporation Law'1 4 ) in
making a proxy irrevocable if (1) it specifically says that
it is irrevocable, and (2) it is used for certain purposes specified in the statute. These purposes include giving the proxy
to a pledgee of, or one who has contracted to purchase, the
shares; to a creditor, who then holds the proxy as a form of
security to protect his investment; and, of course, to a person
under the terms of a voting agreement. In all of these situations, the proxy-holder could be loosely said to have what
Professor Seavey calls a "proprietary interest" in the
proxy. 65 Statutory provisions are especially needed to make
irrevocable proxies useful in corporations, since this branch
of the law is grievously confused by Chief Justice Marshall's
158. S. C. §6.16(f).
159. S. 0. §6.16(b).
160. Ibid.
161. S.C. §6.16(c).
162. Several provisions give important rights to the voting trust certificate holders. Unlike the Model Act, the certificate holders are treated
as shareholders for purposes of inspecting corporate books and records
(S. C. §6.16(d)). Also they have shareholders' rights to dissent to proposed corporate action, and to be paid the fair value of their interests,
although this may be changed or eliminated by the voting trust agreement
(S. C. §6.16(g)).

163.
164.
§47-a.
165.
31 YA

S.C. §6.14(f).
N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §609(f), continuing N. Y. STocx Cor. LAw
Seavey, Termination by Death of ProprietaryPowers of Attorney,
E.L. J.283 (1922).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1963

49

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW
South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
15, Iss. 2 [1963], Art.
2 15.
[Vol.

324

cloudy concept of a "power coupled with an interest" or
"engrafted on an estate," which alone may be irrevocable,
as he declared in Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'r.166 The statutory irrevocable proxy is of limited duration which is defined
by (1) the termination of the situation for which it was
created, e.g., redemption of the pledge, expiration of the
voting agreement, etc., and (2) in all events, its duration is
not to exceed a ten year period, thus tying in its lifespan
with that of the voting agreement and voting trust, and
thereby avoiding any disadvantage time-wise from the con167
trol device chosen.
4. Shareholder Agreements Restricting Director Action:
Of a different character and somewhat in the nature of a
catchall, section 6.22 of the new South Carolina law authorizes agreements among shareholders "respecting the management and affairs of their corporation or the relations of
shareholders among themselves.' 16 Such agreements are improper and not to be set aside solely because they may restrict the power or discretion of the directors of the corporation. Since they are chiefly useful to close corporations, and
impractical, perhaps risky, in large enterprises, they are declared by statute to be valid only so long as shares of the
corporation are not traded on an exchange or actively on an
over-the-counter market. As with other control devices, the
agreement has a maximum life of ten years, subject to renewal or extension. Its effect, by statute, is to relieve the
directors of the liability which is then imposed upon the
shareholders consenting to the agreement.
VIII.

FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES

Although primarily following the Model Act both in broad
outline and in detail, the new South Carolina law adds significant provisions in this field which should commend some
general interest. Most of these are technical matters of detail, not reflecting differences of policy or theory.
166. 8 Wheat (21 U. S.) 174 (1823).
167. Irrevocability of a proxy does not run with the subject shares if
acquired by a person ignorant of the irrevocable proxy, but this may be
overcome by giving notice of "the proxy and of its irrevocability" on the
share certificate, S. C. §6.14 (h).
168. See also N. Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §620(b) and the prototype of all
such validating provisions, N. C.GEN. STAT. §55-73 (c).
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A.

Amendment of Articles of Incorporation

The chapter on amending the articles of incorporation distinguishes for convenience three varieties of amendment, in
contrast to Model Act Section 54's single procedure for
.amending the articles by resolution of the directors followed
by adoption or rejection of the amendment by the shareholders. Although the difference is largely formal, the South
Carolina revisers believed that the three part division was
-conducive to clarity.
First, the articles may be amended in advance of the organzational meeting of the corporation, that is to say, after
the corporation has come into existence but before it has
readied itself to start doing business. At this early stage of
,corporate life, the articles may be amended by the "incorporator or if more than one incorporator, then by twvothirds of the incorporators."' 69 Because the interest of the
subscribers looms large at this point, the South Carolina law
provides that any material amendment to the articles releases a dissenting subscriber from liability on his subscription.17 0 This rescission right is a rule of fairness since after all
the subscribers undertook to purchase shares in one type of
corporation, and a material change in the articles may lock
them into an enterprise of an entirely different character
without their consent. The corporation itself is not unfairly
prejudiced since it has not begun to do business and since it
'has elected to change its character after subscribers have
agreed to chance their money in the enterprise.1 7 '
Secondly, the directors acting alone, without shareholder
approval, may amend the articles with respect to the registered office or registered agent of the corporation by following the Model Act type procedure prescribed by the South
17 2
Carolina law. '
Finally, South Carolina law follows the Model Act in the
standard procedure for amendment by resolution of the board
169. S. C. §9.2.
170. Ibid.
171. In practice this situation should arise infrequently. First, it is
unlikely that the business will be drastically changed between the subscription agreement date and the organizational meeting. Secondly, management could always defer amendment of the articles until the corporation
'has begun business, at which time the articles can be amended by the
standard procedure, a board resolution with two-thirds shareholder approval.
172. S. C. §9.3.
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and two-thirds approval of'the shareholders, with the usual
provision for class voting on the amendment. 173 The proposed amendment, if approved, is embodied in articles of
amendment which are executed, verified and filed with theSecretary of State. In this connection there are several interesting provisions which are not duplicated in the Model Act..
Proceeding on the premise that shareholder participationin corporate affairs is to be encouraged, not discouraged, and.
following traditional local law on this point, the new statuterequires the directors to submit any proposed amendment tothe shareholders either at a special or annual meeting if re-.
quested by "at least ten percent of any class of shares of thecorporation."' 74 Thus, under this section ten percent or more
of the class, e.g., ten percent of the first preferred stock orfive percent of the common stock (but not ten percent of a.
series), have a right to a shareholder vote on a proposed.
amendment of the articles. This procedure bears some anal-ogy to the SEC's Rule 14A-8 under the Securities and Ex-.
change Act of 1934 which requires a listed corporation soliciting proxies to permit shareholders, in certain circumstances, to include their proposals and a short supportingstatement in management's proxy solicitation material. Although sometimes a nuisance, even the SEC rule seems not
to have proved unduly burdensome. The South Carolina provision, in contrast, does not put management to any expense.
or effort on behalf of the shareholder, since his only right
is to have his proposal come before the shareholders; and if'
the meeting consists of a pile of proxies on a table, he must
carry the expense of soliciting them to support him. Unlike.
the SEC rule, which as worded does not effectively cull out
proposals lacking even token shareholder interest, the SouthCarolina provision applies only to proposals which at least
have sufficient merit to garner support from ten percent or
more of a class of shares. With these limitations, it seemsonly fair to permit the shareholder who can claim such support to have a hearing.
The South Carolina law recognizes the interests of a closely
held or medium sized corporation in authorizing the articles
to require a greater than two-thirds vote to amend the articles, 171' e.g., a 75%, 80%, or even a unanimous vote if that is
173. S. C. §9.4, following MODEL AcT §54.

174. S. C. §9.4(d); see S. C. CODE §12-403 (1962).
175. S. C. §9.4 (c).
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desired. This sort of permissive provision, together with
similar authority for superstatutory vote requirements on
mergers and other fundamental corporate changes, is conspicuously ill-adapted for larger corporations; but it is desirable for, and often used in, family or other close corporations seeking to keep the corporate powers and business exclusively within the select group and forcing, in effect, a
unanimous or near-unanimous vote to make any basic change
in the business. Despite the fact that these provisions can
magnify friction into something much more serious, resulting
in total deadlock, nonetheless there seems no public policy
reason for not allowing these high vote requirements if the
shareholders want them; the solution to deadlock is to provide special remedies (as South Carolina law does), not to
look longingly at a supposed "corporate norm" of an exclusive statutory vote percentage. The statute gives a good deal
of flexibility to the draftsman by providing that the high
vote to amend the articles may apply to all amendments or
176
to a particular amendment or category of amendments,
and may be conferred on all shares or any particular class of
shares. 177 To prevent the superstatutory vote which is required to amend the articles from itself being amended out
by the lower statutory vote, the new statute specifically provides that a superstatutory vote provision for amendment
"shall not be altered, modified or removed except by the same
vote which such provision [of the article] requires for amending the articles. 178 That is to say, an 80% vote for amending
the articles may be removed only by an 80% vote. 79
Section 9.8 of the new law offers a simple procedure for
restating the articles of incorporation, especially designed to
facilitate keeping the articles of incorporation and all the
amendments which accrue from time to time in a single,
clear, and up-to-date document. Model Act section 59 appears
to require shareholder approval for all restatements of the
articles. South Carolina law, following several other states
on this matter, requires this only if there are added to the
restated articles any new amendments which would themselves need shareholder approval, if separately proposed and
176. S. C. §9.4(c) (2).
177. S. C. §9.4(e) (3).
178. S. C. §9.4(c) (4).
179. A fourth method, if it can be called such, is by "written consent
of all shareholders entitled to vote on such amendment." (S. C. §9.4(f)).
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submitted to the shareholders. In short, if management wishes to do no more than collate all the amendments and provisions into a single continuous narrative document, it may
do so by action of the board of directors without a shareholder vote, 80 but "the restated articles shall be specifically
designated as such, and shall set forth the manner in which
the restatement was authorized," that is, either by action of
the directors, or by action of the directors plus shareholder
approval of any new matter. Whenever the directors alone
restate the articles, "the restated articles shall recite that it
purports merely to restate but not change the provisions of
the original articles ... and that there is no discrepancy between such provisions and the provisions of the restated articles."'"
B. Mergers and Consolidations
The South Carolina law closely follows the Model Act on
mergers and consolidations, differences being chiefly minor
linguistic matters. Two points, however, may be of general
interest.
The first appears in section 10.3 specifying the information contained in the written or printed notice of the meeting to approve a merger or consolidation. The Model Act
merely requires that written or printed notice shall be given
... in the manner provided in this act for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders, including the purpose of the
meeting and a summary of the plan of merger or consolidation.182 Elaborating on this, section 10.3 requires that the
directors also distribute either a "copy of the plan of merger
or consolidation or an accurate outline of the material feature
of the plan," thereby insuring that shareholders receive full,
accurate, and pertinent information on the proposed corporate changes. In addition, shareholders must be furnished
with balance sheets and profit and loss statements of each
of the merging corporations for the three preceding fiscal
years-a provision not unlike the Securities and Exchange
Act Rule, that full financial information on a merger or
consolidation accompany the proxy statement.8 3
180. Of course, the directors may, in the unusual situation, restate the
articles, and add thereto, without shareholder vote, any provision which
the directors without a shareholder vote could insist, e.g., new provisions
relating to the registered agent and registered office.
181. S. C. §9.8.
182. MODEL ACT §67.
183. Securities Exchange Act Rules, Schedule 14A, Item 14 and 15.
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Finally, the notice of merger must "contain a clear and
concise statement, prominently displayed" of the shareholders' right to dissent to any plan of merger,18 4 again following
an SEC practice. 8 5 Although there are good arguments for
dispensing with all shareholder appraisal rights after a fundamental corporate change, nonetheless it is orthodox that
these rights are the price for escaping the rigid common law
requirement of unanimous shareholder consent. The theory
of the South Carolina provision is that if the right is available-and few indeed believe it practical to abolish it from
statutes-it seems just to set forth in the appropriate place
the fact that the right exists and how it is to be exercised.
Indeed, because of the relatively restrictive procedure governing the exercise of these rights--a restrictive procedure
found both in the new South Carolina law, the Model Act,
and the statutes of most jurisdictions-it seems only fair to
alert dissenting shareholders to possible pitfalls. For example, the shareholder must file a written objection before or
at the meeting (a negative vote is not enough), and again
within the space of twenty days after the meeting he must
file another written demand for the value of his shares. 8 6
Non-notice of these requirements, and the short time period for meeting them, may well result in shareholders forfeiting their rights. Certainly, there can be no injury to corporations or detriment to business in giving fair and accurate
notice of the steps necessary to preserve their rights; and the
statutory notice is an obvious and appropriate place to set
forth these rights. In all events, if there is sufficient distaste
for appraisal rights of shareholders, corporate revisers should
face the problems squarely, develop the (often sound) arguments for abolishing them, and seek to discover some substitute procedure, 18 7 rather than to make inroads upon the share184. S. C. §10.3(b) (4). A similar notice must be given to "outside"
shareholders of a subsidiary participating in a short-form merger with
its parent (S. C. §10.5 (a) (I(D)), and to shareholders entitled to dissent
to a sale of corporate assets (S. C. §11.3 (a) (2)).
185. See Securities Exchange Act Rules, Schedule 14A, Item 2, which
requires that the "rights of appraisal or similar rights of dissenters with
respect to any matter to be acted upon" be outlined briefly, together with
an indication of "any statutory procedure required to be followed by
dissenting security holders in order to perfect such rights."
186. See MoDEL AcT §74 and S. C. §6.27.
187. Compare, for example, Section 72 of the English Companies Act of
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 38, authorizing a specified percentage of certain
classes of shareholders to secure court review of the validity and fairness
of amendments to the articles of incorporation. It should not be unfair
-or wholly impractical to abolish shareholder appraisal rights in this country
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holder rights by technical and picayune requirements, and by
suppressing information needed to exercise those rights intelligently.
Both the Model Act and the South Carolina law authorize
merging a subsidiary corporation into its parent without
shareholder action from either corporation.1 88 Like the Model
Act, although unlike Delaware,1 89 South Carolina does not
permit the reverse procedure of merging parent into subsidiary. In all three statutes, the "outside" share interest in
the subsidiary may be replaced either by securities of the
parent corporation, by obligations, cash or other consideration. The South Carolina statute contains a useful explicit
statement that only the holders of shares in the subsidiary
corporation other than shares held by the parent corporation
are entitled to dissent to a merger, and that "holders of shares
of the parent corporation" shall not be entitled to dissent and
have payment for the fair value of their shares. 9° This is
correct, of course, since in most instances a parent-subsidiary
merger produces a merely formal change in the family of
corporations.
Finally, by way of completeness the South Carolina law
makes specific an implication of Model Act section 70 that
one or more subsidiary corporations, either foreign or domestic, may merge under the provisions of a short-form
merger procedure "into the parent corporation whether foreign or domestic."' 9 ' The only conditions are that the general
short-form merger section would apply except for the fact
that the parent or one of the subsidiaries is a foreign corporation, and the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign
and to substitute therefor a protective judicial procedure, as in England,
which would evaluate the fairness of transactions for which at present
appraisal rights exist (including mergers); such a proceeding would also
consider the fairness of the share exchange ratio. It could be made summary with priority on court calendars to minimize delay, which in all
events should be no more, and probably less, than the time consumed in
litigation or settling up appraisal rights. If the percentage of shareholders
required to petition for such review is significant, e.g., ten or fifteen
percent of a given class, there would seem slight danger of its use for
"strike" purposes, particularly since the incentive of a money award which is the outcome of successful appraisal right litigation and which is,
of course, the motive behind all "strike" litigation - is absent, since the
court would only be expected to confirm or set aside the transaction.
Finally, this sort of substitute procedure would eliminate the drain of
cash payments in settlement of appraisal rights.
188. MODEL AcT §68A; S. C. 10.5.
189. D. CORP.LAw §253.
190. S. C.§10.5 (a) (4).
191. S. C. §10.7(b).
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,enterprise permits a short-form merger under "substantially
the same terms and conditions" as does South Carolina. The
xevisers thought that this provision was helpful, and noted
that it did not appear in the Model Act in the explicit terms
stated here although it is implied by Model Act section 70's
authorization of merger and consolidation between foreign and
domestic corporations. Psychologically, if for no other reason, it would seem desirable to put beyond doubt the power
of a foreign parent corporation to create a local subsidiary
and thereafter merge the subsidiary into the parent. Similar
considerations would apply to the reverse
situation of a local
192
parent and an out-of-state subsidiary.
C.

Sale of Corporate Assets

The South Carolina chapter on sale and other disposition
of corporate assets contains some useful features not appearing in, but not inconsistent with the Model Act, which otherwise is closely followed.
Apart from making a useful linguistic change at the outset
so that the statutory material becomes more readable, 19 3 the
South Carolina revisers thought it desirable to mark out more
specifically the vital distinction, upon which so much of this
material turns, between sales of assets in, and those out of,
the regular course of business. Objections to the Model Act
statement were that it assumed as self-evident the distinction and thus afforded no guidance. Accordingly, the South
Carolina revisers attempted to demarcate a distinction between these two types of dispositions.
The technique used was to adopt as guidelines or criteria,
with some variations, certain useful provisions which in the
North Carolina law 94 are the sole grounds for authorizing a
sale of assets without shareholder approval. In contrast, the
South Carolina provisions are not exclusive, for section 11.2
192. S. C. §10.5, also states that the short form procedure does not bar
merger or consolidation under any other procedure; and, more importantly,
that "any plan or merger which requires or contemplates any changes
other than those specifically authorized" by the short form section "shall
be accomplished under the provisions" of the general merger section.
193. MoDEr. ACT §§71-73 continually repeat the cumbersome phrase "sale,

lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition" of corporate assets.
S. C. §11.1 initially defines the term "sale" to include all of these transactions (except that in South Carolina law, mortgages and like creditor
transactions have special treatment, see text at p. 198, infra), and thus
makes the substantive sections read more smoothly.

194. N. C. GrN. STAT. §55-112 (1960).
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provides that whether or not an asset disposition occurs within the usual and regular course of business is determined by
all the "circumstances of the transaction," including the character of the business in which the corporation is engaged at
the time of or immediately preceding the transaction. For
example, the disposition of real estate, even though constituting a major or substantial part of the assets of the corporation, by a real estate development company, would be a transaction within the "usual and regular course of business,"
because this is "the character of the business" in which that
corporation is engaged at the time of the transaction. More
specifically, a sale of assets may be considered to occur in
the regular course of its business if one of the two following
criteria is met: (1) the corporation was incorporated for
the purpose of liquidating the assets or property disposed of;
or (2) the sale is a transaction or one of a series of transactions to further the corporate business and not to terminate or dispose of it. The question whether a transaction is
within or without the usual and regular course of business
will always be essentially one of fact, as the South Carolina
law recognizes; but the criteria suggested should be useful in
delimiting the circumstances when it is necessary to secure
shareholder approval as a matter of safety.
Another point is worth noting on sale of assets. South
Carolina, unlike the Model Act but in accord with several
other states, including some much concerned with shareholder
interests, permits mortgage or pledge of corporate assets
without shareholder approval, 195 unless such approval is required by the terms of the articles of incorporation. 198 Theoretically, perhaps, it is questionable whether, for purposes of
deciding whether or not to require shareholder approval, to
distinguish so sharply between transactions which can have
a similar economic impact on the business. In practice, however, the distinction seems sound and workable, and apparently the discretion of management in entering into these
195. S. C. §11.4. Present South Carolina practice is clearly, and the

uncertainty phrased, former statute (see S. C. CODE §12-102(4) (1952))
is apparently, in accord.
196. Unlike the Model Act, S. C. §11.2(b) authorizes the articles to require shareholder consent even for a sale of assets in the regular course of

business. This not only accords with the policy of maximum freedom to
shape corporate structure, but it is likely to be a very vital matter to the

shareholders, especially in a close corporation which is probably the only
type of enterprise which will reserve shareholder control over asset sales
in the regular course of business.
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credit transactions has not been seriously abused. After all,
mortgages and pledges are credit transactions, and in purpose
and form and result are usually different from sales, leases
and exchanges of property, and thus they are more closely
related to the "usual and regular" business of the corpora-

tion.
D.

Dissolution and Liquidation of Corporations

South Carolina has largely followed the Model Act on dissolving corporations, with, however, several additional provisions.
Voluntary dissolution is more readily available under the
new South Carolina law than under the Model Act. Thus, a
dissolution resolution may be offered by twenty percent of afl
shareholders' 9 7-a sufficiently large number to cull out mischievous or publicity-seeking shareholders, since, absent serious internal troubles, it is unlikely that one-fifth of all
shareholders will propose corporate suicide. Also, the articles of incorporation may authorize "any shareholder, or the
holders of any specified number or proportion or class of outstanding shares," to dissolve the corporation "at will or upon
the occurrence of any specified event or contingency."'1 8 Designed only for close corporations (since it is valid only so
long as the corporate shares are not traded on an exchange
or on an over the counter market), it helps to minimize differences between corporations and partnerships as a means of
doing business.
Involuntary dissolution by court order, available generally
as in the Model Act to break a deadlock, may be had, under
the South Carolina law by alternatively showing irreparable
injury (as in the Model Act) or, as a less stringent standard
that "the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally."'.9 9 The desirability of a looser alternative test is shown
by extreme judicial reluctance to dissolve a hopelessly dead197. S. C. §12.2 (a) (2).
198. S. C. §12.14, following N. Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §1105. The appropriate court has jurisdiction to enforce this dissolution option. S. C.
§12.15 (a) (6).
199. The same criteria apply if "the shareholders are so divided respecting the management and affairs of the corporation" that irreparable injury will result or "the advantage to the shareholders generally" will be
lost. This accommodates the small corporations, whose business is conducted entirely by the shareholders, perhaps even without directors.
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locked corporation which may still be able to drift along at
some profit, although the shareholders are at each others'
throats. Hence, section 12.5(f) specifies that dissolution is
liot to be denied solely "because it is found that the business
of the corporation has been or could be conducted at a
prof it."
The most significant innovation in this area is the adaptation for American use of section 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948200 empowering courts to grant alternative
relief under circumstances justifying dissolution. Section 210,
as interpreted by English case law, enables the court to take
all steps necessary to break a deadlock in a corporation, including, but not limited to, enjoining provisions of the articles of incorporation or the by-laws or resolutions, or even
compelling a buyout of share interests. The English experience has been so successful that the only complaint is that
the court's power is too limited, because presently too closely
tied to a showing of need for dissolution. 201 Relief ordered
under this section has included in one case a compulsory buyout of shares, 20 2 and in another case a decree which, while
not ordering the recalcitrant shareholder to sell out his interthat his attempted ruth,
est, adjusted corporate affairs such
203
less conduct would be harmless.
South Carolina, accordingly, authorizes its courts to grant
"such relief, other than dissolution as in its discretion it
deems appropriate," including cancellation of provisions of the
articles or by-laws or resolutions, affirmative directions to
shareholders, directors or others, and a compulsory purchase
at their fair value of shares of any shareholders either by
200. Companies Act, 1948, §210, 11 and 12 Geo. VI, c. 38.
201. See Elder v. Elder and Watson, Ltd., [19521 Sess. Cas. 49 (Scot.
land). The Jenkins Committee, which has reported a number of significant
proposals for revising the English Companies Act, has recommended that
Section 210 be amended to dispense with any showing of a need for dis.
solution, so that this provision will be converted into a general remedy for
breach of duty by directors and other insiders and for settling or eliminat
ing serious intra-corporate disputes. Company Law Committee, Report,
Cmd. No. 1749, at 74-78 (1962). A similar recommendation has been
made with respect to comparable provisions in the Companies Act (North.
ern Ireland) of 1932. Company Law Amendment, Report, Cmd. No. 393,
at 10-12 (1958). The' Draft Companies Code 1961 of Ghana §218 accords with the Jenkins Committee recommendations. Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administration of the Present Company Law
of Ghana, FinalReport 160-162 (1961).
202. Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society, Ltd., v. Meyer, [19591
A. C. 324 (H. L. 1958).
203. In re H. R. Harmer, Ltd., [1959] Week. L. Rep. 62 (C. A. 1958).
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the corporation or by other shareholders. 04 Such relief may
be prayed for by any person who under section 12.15 (corresponding to Model Act section 90) has standing to petition
a court for dissolution, thus making the alternative relief
available in the typical case of a director or shareholder deadlock. All relief, it must be stressed, is discretionary, and not
a matter of right of any shareholder; and it is anticipated
that courts will be discreet and sparing in the exercise of
their powers. This is doubly important since, unlike the present English statute, relief is not necessarily confined to the
extreme circumstances which call for dissolution. Rather it
is available "whenever the circumstances of the case are such
that relief, but not dissolution, would be appropriate." Thus,
for example, a critical deadlock in a corporation would give
rise, under the South Carolina sections to several types of
relief: (1) dissolution of the corporation, either on the standard of irreparable injury or inability of the corporation to
function to the benefit of the shareholders generally; (2) discretionary relief as an alternative to dissolution; and (3) discretionary relief where the situation does not demand the
drastic remedy of dissolution, but where some adjustment
of intracorporate relations is needed.
Several reasons justify this new statutory jurisdiction.
Most important is the increased likelihood of deadlock both
under the South Carolina and other state statutes, which
consistently authorize high vote requirements and shareholders agreements productive of deadlock. Absent the kind
of relief South Carolina now authorizes, dissolution may be
the only remedy. But because this is usually a harsh remedy,
both for the shareholders (loss of investment), the corporation (loss of going concern value) and at times for the public, the courts should have a wider choice than that of dissolution or continuing a bad situation. Also, the English experience suggests that the mere fact that the relief is available
is itself a strong incentive for shareholders and directors to
work out their problems among themselves, since the threat
of court action generates an attitude of reasonableness and
conciliation. If this proves to be so, this new section has unquestionably done its job even better than if it is invoked in
court.
204. S. C. §12.23.
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IX. CORPORATE FINANCE
South Carolina closely follows the Model Act in its treatment of corporate finance. This embraces, first, the healthy
trend towards broadening the corporation's authority to issue
all types of shares recognized by the money markets as useful
means of raising equity capital.20 5 In addition, South Carolina goes beyond the Model Act in dealing specifically with
bonds and debentures, including provisions on consideration
for their issue, 20 6 their voting rights (if any),207 and convertible issues of such securities. 208 In the second important
area of corporate finance-dividends and other distributions
-the major development attributable to the Model Act is
the serious reliance of all modern corporation statutes (including South Carolina) upon accounting concepts, techniques
and procedures, to define legal requirements, thereby giving
to the law a degree of precision impossible under the older
statutes with their uncertain and ill-defined terms.
A. Shares and Their Issue:
Although generally South Carolina adheres to the Model
Act on types of shares, there are several differences worth
brief notice.
1. Redeemable Shares: The Model Act authorizes, without elaboration, issue of redeemable shares, "of preferred or
special classes." 20 9 This presents several problems. First,
this wording leaves uncertain whether a corporation may issue redeemable common, since two highly respected courts,
at least, have reached contrary conclusions on this point under statutes authorizing redeemable "preferred and special
classes" of shares. 210 South Carolina settles the issue by ex205. Correspondingly this removes uncertainties generated by old restrictive provisions. The former South Carolina law, for instance, left
crippling doubt as to the validity of non-voting common shares, now
dispelled by S. C. §§51.(a) and 6.11(b). Similarly, specification in the
old law of permissible preferences and restrictions for no par "preferred
capital stock" cast doubt on par value preferred; in all events, no statute
should even give rise to a negative implication on so significant a matter.
Similarly clouded was no-par preferred in series, and in all events authority was wholly lacking for directors to issue any shares in series. All
of this is clarified under the new law.
206. S. C. §5.23.
207. S. C. §6.11(d).
208. S. C. §§5.24 (b)-(d), 5.6 (f).
209. MODnL AcT §14, par. 2.
210. See Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191
At]. 887 (Ch.), aff'd, 2 A. 2d 249 (S. Ct. 1937) (holding that Dr. CoRP.
LAW §243( a), authorizing redeemable "preferred or special shares?" does
not permit redeemable common). Contra, Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons,
331 Mass. 670, 121 N. E 2d 850 (1954).
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pressly forbidding redeemable common shares other than
those of regulated open-end investment companies subject to
the Investment Company Act of 1940.211
This prohibition seems justified. If redeemable common is
permissible, a corporation could redeem such shares when
financially threatened, although one had supposed that the
common should bear the ultimate risk of loss or profit. The
usual limitations-that shares may not be redeemed if the

corporation is or would thereby be rendered insolvent 212 would seem insufficient protection against weakening the
corporation's financial position, either by dispersion of cash
or paying of the redeemed shares of some type of creditor
security. There are additional temptations since management, so far as it is identified with stock ownership, is usually most interested in the common. Thus, minority shares,
especially those held by dissident shareholders, would be at
the mercy of management or majority shareholders who, by
calling in the stock at will, could destroy the independence of
shareholders of matters committed to them by statute. Again,
even though soundly managed enterprises, especially companies subject to compulsory disclosure, seem not to issue such
stock, the risk of abuse could well be great in small corporations. In short, the advantages of redeemable common seem
incommensurate with the risks both to the corporation, its
creditors, and other shareholders.
Secondly, South Carolina forbids shares redeemable at the
option of the shareholders.2 13 The risks are related although
different in an important respect. Here, the financial integrity of the corporation is exposed, in large measure, to the
action of persons not carrying the responsibilities, legal and
economic, of management; and since the interest of the shareholder in hard times is naturally to cut his loss, his option
to bail out could greatly damage the financial, especially the
cash, position of the corporation in a time when it probably
needs to marshal and conserve its resources. Once again.
the risk of injury to the corporation, and to the public and
creditor interest in financially sound enterprises, would seem
211. S. C. §5.18(b) (1). The exception for mutual funds recognizes
both business practicalities and the SEC supervision and mandatory disclosure provided in the Investment Company Act of 1940.
212. MoDEL ACT §60; S. C. 5.18(c). Both statutes guarantee maintenance of net assets equal to the liquidation preferences of certain shares.
shares.
213. S. C. §5.18 (b) (2).
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to outweigh a corporation's theoretical interest in being free
to issue such shares.
On the surface, it would seem that these prohibitions could
be nullified by the corporation's undoubted right (in America) to repurchase its own shares. This argument is not persuasive. Both the Model Act and South Carolina set forth
fairly rigorous requirements for the corporation to repurchase its own shares, confining it to unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus, or capital surplus if authorized by
the articles or a two-thirds shareholder vote; stated capital
is available only in the most limited circumstances. 2 14 The
criterion in itself contrasts sharply with the insolvency limitation alone governing redemptions. Moreover, it would seem
that the statutory power to repurchase shares will fulfill
every legitimate need for redeemable common shares or shares
(of any sort) redeemable at the option of the shareholder.
2. FractionalShares and Scrip: Both South Carolina and
the Model Act authorize fractional shares or scrip. Thus,
under Model Act section 22, a corporation may, but need not,
issue a fractional share certificate or alternatively may issue
scrip. South Carolina is more restrictive on the right to have
fractional shares, but more liberal on alternative means of
treating them. 215 The premise here is that share fractions
have no real raison d'etre other than as the residue of stock
splits and stock dividends; and that the legitimate purposes
which fractional shares might serve can just as well be handled through other techniques with little inconvenience and
less risk to the corporation. Thus an unqualified right to
issue share fractions represented by certificates entitling the
holder to vote and receive dividends, is questionable. Under
both the Model Act and the South Carolina law, a corporation may use resources other than earned or capital surplus
to "eliminat[e] fractional shares, ' 216 thereby making possible
redemption of shares out of capital. Indeed, nothing seemingly bans a corporation from treating all of its shares as fractions of a larger denomination, and therefore subject to re214. S. C. §5.17; MODEL ACT §5. Corporation law revisions should
probably also include a provision permitting repurchase, especially by
small corporations, of shares on buy-out and option agreements, especially
on death, withdrawal, etc., of shareholders. Compare the somewhat unsatisfactory efforts in this direction in N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-52(b) (4)
(1960); OHIo REv.CODE ANN. §1701.35 (A) (5) is superior.
215. S.C. §5.11.
216. MODEL ACT§5; S. C. §5.17(d) (1).
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purchase out of capital. Foreclosing this risk and recognizing
no real reason to encourage fractional shares, South Carolina
requires share fractions to be aggregated into whole shares
and then provides that only fractions "remaining after such
21
aggregation" have the privileges of fractional shares. 7
Besides allowing a corporation to issue scrip (as does
the Model Act), South Carolina also permits corporations
to "pay in cash the fair value of fractions of shares as of
the time when those entitled to receive such fractions are
determined." This should be of special interest to larger
corporations, giving it the alternative of issuing scrip or
paying cash for share fractions.
3. Subscriptions: Broadly following Model Act section 16,
the South Carolina law extends the statutory benefit of irrevocability both to post-incorporation and pre-incorporation
subscriptions (to which the Model Act provision is confined) .218 Secondly, as in many other states, all subscriptions
must be in writing and signed by the subscriber; absent statute a subscription agreement may be oral. Apart from the
wisdom generally of reducing serious agreements to writing,
it is also desirable since the Uniform Securties Act, like the
Securties Act of 1933,219 defines "security" to include "any
preorganization certificate or subscription," and thereby subjecting it to the registration requirements of the act. The
transaction exemption for subscriptions is lost if anyone is
paid for soliciting subscriptions, if there are more than ten
subscriptions, or if any subscriber makes the payment on
the subscription ;220 and a transaction in violation of the act
creates, of course, substantial civil liabilities.2 21 Since subscriptions fall within the scope of the most frequently adopted securities statute in this country, it would be well, therefore, if all subscriptions were reduced to writing.
4. Preferred Shares: Rules of Construction: An innovation in American corporation law is the South Carolina provision setting forth certain presumptions as to the rights of
preferred shares.2 22 Thus, preferred shares are presumed
cumulative but not participating as to dividends, and also
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

S. C. §5.11(a).
MoD;E. ACT §16; S. C. §5.5.
Uniform Securities Act §401(1); Securities Act of 1933, §2(1).
Id. §402(b) (10).
Id. §410.
S. C. §5.4.
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preferred on liquidation to their par or stated value; a liquidation preference is presumed exclusive without further participation, except for cumulative preferred which is presumed
entitled on liquidation to be paid the accrued dividends. Finally, all preferred shares are presumed disfranchised (except
as the statute otherwise allows).
This sort of provision can serve, it is believed, several useful purposes. First, it states summarily the result of much
sound American case law. By and large, these rules fairly
reflect what corporations normally intend to give, and what
investors normally expect to receive, in a preferred share.
Secondly, it removes uncertainty. The alternative to such a
statutory guidepost is searching a large body of case lawsome of which is conflicting as to rule, and much of which
turns upon the precise (or more likely, imprecise or nonexistent) language of the preferred shares in the particular
case. Thirdly, besides serving as a sort of check-list for the
more usual, if not the more sophisticated, issues, it seems a
matter which lends itself a codification without inhibition
since all of the rules are expressly subject to variation by the
22 3
terms of the preferred shares contract.
B.

Dividends and Other Distributions

With two exceptions, South Carolina and the Model Act
agree on treating dividends, the key provision in both statutes limiting dividends to "unrestricted and unreserved earned
surplus," subject, of course, to distributions out of capital
surplus if protective procedures are followed. More basic, as
already noted, the South Carolina statute in following the
Model Act, makes the far-reaching decision to introduce important accounting concepts into the law. Finally, an important issue in this area is whether to give management maxi223. Two other minor provisions are worth noting. (1) Taking its cue

from MODEL ACT §18. which prohibits "promissory notes" or "future
services" as payment for shares, S. C. §5.7(b) seeks fuller coverage by
providing that "Cn3either promissory notes nor other obligations, including
any endorsement or guaranty of an obligation of the corporation" nor
"any agreement to perform future services," is legal payment. (2) S. C.
§5.8,stock
while
following
MODE requires
ACT §1SA
in they
authorizing
of
options,
specifically
that
are to bebroadly
issued the
onlyissue
"as
an incentive to service or continued service to the corporation, a subsidiary
or affiliate," thereby codifying some sound decisions from Delaware and
elsewhere. This provision should afford some guidance to courts in a
difficult area for which breach-of-duty concepts are crude tools; it would
also seem superior to efforts, as in N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-45(b) (1960),
to prescribe detailed limits on the value, etc., of the options.
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mum freedom in declaring dividends, including the control of
the earned surplus account, or to provde by statute some
minimum guarantee of dividend payments, as in North Carolina. Apart from the unavoidable complexity of such protective devices, the South Carolina revision assumes that fraudulent or dishonest withholding of dividends, to squeeze out
-minority interests-the usual cause of abuse in this areacould better be handled by the courts as a breach of duty.
1. Unrealized Appreciation: A basic difference between
the Model Act and South Carolina is the latter's prohibition
against writing-up the earned surplus account (the prime
dividends source) with unrealized asset appreciation. 224 Absent such a prohibition, there's a measurable chance that under an earned surplus test, assets could be written up from
their cost basis and dividends paid out of this increase.225
Indeed, one of the Model Act draftsmen asserts that the Model
Act does permit such a write-up,2 2 6 although another member of the Committee on Corporate Laws has argued that it
should be available only for share, but not for cash or prop22 7
erty, dividends.
It was believed that the risk of dividends out of such an
artificial source would exceed whatever gain might accrue
from management "flexibility" or "freedom" on this matter.
Indeed, it was thought affirmatively desirable to prescribe
such a practice. Otherwise, corporations are apt to assume
that they may pay dividends out of what is essentially a
bookkeeping entry. Moreover, it is difficult to see how an
unrealized increase in the value of an asset can logically be
deemed a part of earned surplus (the retained earnings or
retained income account), and indeed accountants believe that
such a write-up is contrary to sound accounting practice.
Again, a write-up of assets followed by dividend payments
may have detrimental effects on the corporation's financial
condition not known or clearly understood until bankruptcy
224. As in the Model Act, dividends are payable out of "unreserved and
unrestricted earned surplus" (S. C. U5.14(a) (1)), but earned surplus is
defined to exclude unrealized appreciation (S. C. §1.2 (q)).
225. Compare Randall v. Bailey, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (S. C. 1940), aff'd,
288 N. Y. 280, 43 N. E. 2d 43 (1942), overruled by N. Y. Bus. Corn. LAW
§102(a) (6), with Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52
A. 2d 571 (1957).
226. Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use in the Model Business CorporationAct, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 440-43 (1952).
227. Garrett, Capital and Surplus under the New Corporation Statutes,
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 259 (1958).
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or some other problem with creditors. Write-ups plus dividends may dissipate the margin of safety for creditors or
preferred shareholders, even though the distributions might
themselves not cause the corporation to become insolvent.
If asset values fluctuate, the asset which cost $X and is written up to $X+$100 may be worth only $+$50 several years
later (even allowing for depreciation), and yet the earned
surplus account remains swollen unless written down to reflect the value decrease. Again, the level to which assets are
to be written up involves an element of judgment, including
misjudgment, negligent or deliberate, which may injure creditors and shareholders. Finally, the permission is a needless.
temptation to unscrupulous individuals to write-up share
values, distribute dividends, and thereby promote a misleading picture of corporate prosperity, to the detriment of creditors, investors, and the corporation.
The South Carolina revisers believed that the arguments
against unrealized appreciation tipped the balance decisively
towards a clear cut prohibition against including it in earned
surplus. Although it might be argued that a statute should
be concerned only with the "legality" rather than the "advisability" of such a dividend source, it is nonetheless true
that the advisability of a practice potentially affecting the
soundness of corporations is, or should be, a dominant factor
in choosing a rule of law for a new statute.
2. Accounting Treatment of Treasury Shares: The considerable attention paid to the accounting treatment of treasury shares is in inverse proportion to its importance, but is a
favorite topic of argument perhaps because of its somewhat
esoteric appeal. South Carolina abandons the Model Act'streatment by which earned surplus is restricted while sharesare held in the "treasury," and the restriction removed on
disposition or cancellation of shares.228 Rather, the new
statute proceeds forthrightly to provide that on acquisition,
earned surplus is "reduced" by cost of the shares; that on
sale, the consideration is capital surplus or, at the corporation's option, earned surplus to the amount of the original
reduction; that stated capital is unaffected whether the shares228. The South Carolina revision was much influenced by the discussionby Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business CorporationAct, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1393-1402 (1957) and Rudolph, Accounting forTreasury Shares Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 73 HARv..
L. RpV. 323 (1959), both critical of the Model Act "restriction" technique.
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are retained or sold, 22 9 and that distribution to shareholders
does not require any transfer to stated capital (as does a
share dividend) ,230 although, of course, the reduction of
earned surplus becomes permanent. This procedure seems
most consistent with the basic premise that treasury shares
are a part of issued, although not outstanding, shares; 2 31 that

they therefore remain a part of the corporation's stated
capital ;232 and that the acquisition of treasury shares does not
represent any contraction of stated capital.

X.

CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS

The South Carolina law follows the current fashion in specially considering the close corporation. This is no fad, but
a belated recognition that the greatest number of American
corporations are in this category. Indeed, American law is
now doing no more than catching up with England which
long ago recognized for special treatment "private companies," 23 3 which are in some ways equivalent to American
close corporations. South Carolina statute goes probably
further than any other state in specially providing for close
corporations. The Model Act contains some provisions specially pertinent here, but omits others that are certainly
needed.
South Carolina rejected a special statute for close corporations, for reasons already noted earlier in this article, and
instead merely inserted in the general corporate law certain
specific provisions. This seems appropriate at this stage of
our knowledge of the needs, both business and legal, of the
close corporation; although in the future it may be possible
to draft a separate statute, this should come about as the
culmination of a long process of study and especially of judicial decision-like the Uniform Partnership Act which
crowned centuries of case law development. In all events,
whatever the future, the current technique is to fashion special
provisions for the close corporation; some of them are intrinsically inapplicable to larger corporations, while others
are specifically limited to close corporations.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

S. C. §5.17(c).
S. C. §5.15 (a) (2).
S. C. §1.2(k); MODEL ACT §2(h).
S. C. §1.2(1); MODEL ACT §2(j).
Companies Act, 1948, 11 and 12 Ceo. VI, c. 38, §28.
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Most of the provisions which bear upon the interests of the
closely held corporation have been discussed already, and
need only cursory mention here. They include, like the Model
Act, superstatutory voting and quorum requirements, which
cannot be amended out except by the vote which is to be
protected. Similarly applicable are sections which validate
informal shareholder and director action. Of particular importance to small enterprises are various shareholder control
devices including those enabling the shareholders to manage
the day-to-day business of the corporation. Other relevant
provisions authorize the shareholders directly to elect and
remove officers; proportion the number of directors to the
number of shareholders when there are fewer than three
shareholders; and fix consideration on the issue of shares.
Similarly useful is the authorization of dissolution options
for a particular shareholder or class or number of shareholders; and broad court jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation on petition of a shareholder, and the judicial relief alternative to dissolution.
XI. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The South Carolina law closely follows the Model Act on
foreign corporations. Indeed, many of the same considerations which call for uniformity on state securities regulations
are applicable here, in order to meet the requirements of
corporations doing a multi-state business, and therefore wishing to qualify in several states.
On serving process on foreign corporations, South Carolina adds to the standard provision (which appears in the
Model Act

23 4

) for process service on authorized foreign cor-

porations, a desirable procedure for reaching unauthorized
foreign corporations which either have an exemption from
qualification or have wilfully or negligently failed to qualify. 23 1 Thus, "every foreign corporation which is not au-

thorized to do business in this state shall, by doing in this
state, either itself or through an agent, any business, including any business for which authority need not be obtained"
be deemed to have designated the Secretary of State as its
agent to receive service of process. Such a provision is ob234. MODEL ACT §108; S. C. §13.13.
235. S. C. §13.14: See N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §307. This continues prior

statute law (S. C. CoDE §10-424 (1952)).
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viously constitutional under Supreme Court decisions sustaining constructive designation of the Secretary of State as an
agent for process service in in personam actions. 236 The statute also makes it clear that this constructive designation is
effected even though the foreign corporation under the statute
need not secure authority in this state. Similarly, after specifying the business for which a foreign corporation needs no
authorization, section 13.1(c) specifies that these exemptions
"shall not be deemed to establish a standard for activities
which may subject a foreign corporation to service or process." 23 7 The standards are and should be different. For example, there is good reason not to require authority for a
foreign concern to carry through an isolated business transaction in the state, but that is no reason to immunize it from
suit on a right arising out of the transaction. Similarly, control of a subsidiary does not require the parent corporation
to qualify, 235 but the parent's control may well be sure that
it has made itself emenable to service of process because the
subsidiary is the parent's "agent." Absent this qualifying
clause, it is arguable that exemption from authorization may
also be determinative of the validity of process served on the
unauthorized foreign corporation.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to show not only South Carolina's indebtedness to the Model Act, but also some of the
reasons prompting departures from the Model Act or, in the
more usual case, inducing the South Carolina revisers to
include additional provisions. No corporation law can expect
to achieve complete coverage. Therefore, the most important
means of keeping a corporation law workable and modern is
to keep a constant eye, as do the Model Act draftsmen, upon
the constantly developing problems in the field and the decisions; and to institutionalize this oversight through a standing committee-a program which, it is hoped, can be inaugurated in South Carolina and which would seem desirable in
any state keenly interested in the legal problems of doing
business in the corporate form.

236. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 353 (1927).
237. Adapted from N. Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §1301(c).

238. S. C. §13.1(b) (8).
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